The Sense of the term παρρησία in the Laches

Abstract

This article aims at analyzing the sense of the term παρρησία and its derivative verb παρρησιάζεσθαι in Plato’s Laches. The aim of the investigation is to consider the term and the verb in their semantic relationship with the other terms and concepts linked to them, and to show the sense acquired by this concept in the specific dialogical situation of this text. To this end, we have methodologically analyzed the semantics of other terms, as γελοῖον and ἀνακοινόω-ἀνακοινοῦσθαι, which we found in other Platonic dialogues and which are discussed in order to catch the sense of παρρησία in the Laches. The analysis of both texts and contexts we have conducted shows that the concept of παρρησία, at least in the Laches, characterizes the dialogical space as a dialogical community. In this dialogue, the παρρησία shows the need – for the interlocutors who “truly” want to discuss – of harmonizing the discourses with lives, according to the Socratic sentence of the Apology, by which an unexamined life is not worth to be lived.