PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE DE LA CONSCIENCE NORMATIVE

Resumo

Discussing from a phenomenological stance the distinction between hyletic and expressive conceptions of norms, I stress that phenomenology is able to develop an analysis of nomothetic intentionality that can surmount the opposition presented by Alchourrón and Bulygin. However, this entails a revision of the Husserlian analysis of the relationship between judgments and norms, namely of his thesis concerning the foundation of every intentional act in objectifying acts. I highlight the specificity of normative intentionality, its non-dependence on objectifying acts, and I propose to name the quality of normative acts as “ductive force”. Then, I take distance to the classical analysis of normative judgments as having the ought-form, outlining a more detailed analysis of them, namely stressing that the juridical propositions must have a richer content in order to describe norms. Then, I propose my own account based on the concept of “ductive force”. I affirm that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified only with coercion. I show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. Finally, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world.