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Analysing Language in Legal Contexts

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ABSTRACT: This paper discusses, with detailed exemplification, some of the areas where forensic linguists have moved beyond description to acting on and changing the world. Examples from three murder trials show how essential it is, in order to protect the rights of witnesses and defendants, to have audio records of significant interviews with police officers. The article then discusses the potentially serious consequences of the many communicative problems inherent in legal-lay interaction and illustrates a few of the linguist-led improvements to important texts. Finally the article turns to the problems of using linguistic data to try to determine the geographical origin of asylum seekers.

Keywords: forensic; interaction; legal; linguistics; police

He who controls the past, controls the future, he who controls the present controls the past.
(George Orwell, *1984)*

Making Records of Interaction

Most of the evidence used in the solving of crimes and in the prosecution of those accused is collected by police officers. However, this can put them in a dangerously powerful position, particularly where verbal evidence is concerned, because it is typically much more open to contamination, as I will now exemplify and for this reason witnesses in general and suspects in particular need protection.

From the beginning of the 20th century British judges insisted that, as far as possible, what was said by and to an accused should be written down in direct speech, rather than in indirect speech or in summary form. This was because, in Austinian terms, they wanted to receive the uninterpreted *locution* as they felt that it was the role of the court to determine the *illocutionary* force of the words. I will not expand on the linguistic assumptions underlying this position, but will merely give an example of it at work. In a famous English case, that of Derek Bentley in 1953 which is the subject of a feature film entitled *Let Him Have It* (1991), the accused who had already been arrested was claimed by the police to have shouted out to his companion the words "Let him have it, Chris", after which Chris shot at and killed a policeman. At trial the lawyers discussed at length the two possible interpretations, either 'give [the policeman] the gun' or 'shoot [the policeman]'. The defence argued for the first interpretation because it could be used as mitigating evidence, while the prosecution argued for the second as it was essential for their case – they could only secure a conviction for murder, as Bentley was already under arrest at the time of the shooting, if they could show that he had *incited* his companion to kill. For more details see Coulthard and Johnson (2007: 173-80).

Significantly, the defence did not challenge the admissibility of the utterance nor even question the accuracy of the wording, even though the police admitted that the words had not been recorded contemporaneously, but had only been written written down several hours later. It was simply accepted at the time and for decades afterwards, that policemen could remember accurately what had been said and write down a verbatim record of it from memory several hours later.

At the time of this murder, in an ideal situation, two police officers would interview a suspect; one officer would ask questions while the other would make a contemporaneous verbatim handwritten longhand record of what both participants said and this record was later typed up. However, all too often the courts did not get a contemporaneous verbatim record, not because the records were not produced honestly and conscientiously, but because of the problems inherent in the system. As we linguists now know all too well this process has inherent problems, not least that while people speak at over 200 words a minute, people can only produce legible handwriting at speeds closer to 25 words a minute.

Worse, a convention arose that allowed police officers to make brief notes, called *trigger notes*, which could later be 'made up', drawing on their recollection of the interaction, into what looked like a verbatim record. Thus police officers were totally in control of the verbal evidence. Not only did they decide which topics were covered during interviews, they also controlled what was and what was not recorded - there was no provision for the accused to make and then to present in court his own contemporaneous written version of what was said, nor even to produce an agreed record collaboratively with the police officers. If he disputed the accuracy of an interview record the only option open to the accused was to refuse to sign it, but even that did not prevent the record being accepted as an accurate and true record by the court, provided it was signed by two police officers.

These early police records are fascinating documents, because they are, on the one hand, factual records of interaction, but on the other hand texts whose function is to re-present this interaction at a later time to a different audience and for a different metalinguistic purpose. So they have not only an evidential, but also a persuasive function. Indeed, the police participants were certainly very aware, at the time they were engaged in the primary interaction and producing the written record, for whom this record was ultimately intended -

certainly some records are clearly constructed consciously and specifically with the future audience in mind, as in the following example.

In 1986 Ashley King was accused and convicted of battering an old lady to death, solely on the basis of his own partial confession, which he had retracted almost immediately afterwards. In the early interviews King admitted he had known the woman and indeed that he had visited her to ask for money on the very day she was murdered. The police evidence produced in court included the 'records' of ten interviews, each set out as a sequence of Questions and Answers with what the police and King had apparently said presented inside inverted commas – the implication was that these utterances had been recorded verbatim and contemporaneously. In fact it later transpired that only one of the interviews had been recorded contemporaneously, all the others had been 'made up' (this is the expression the police officers standardly used for this process) afterwards from *trigger* notes and/or from memory. I will demonstrate, using one of the records, just how much was added from memory in the process of 'making up' the notes and will argue that the record presented to the jury is significantly and prejudicially different from the underlying trigger notes.

Part of the prosecution strategy was to convince the jury that Ashley King was untrustworthy and prone to lie. Early in the trial the following interview record was read aloud for the jury (I have numbered the utterances and highlighted some items in **bold** in order to be able to refer to them later).

Text 1a Extract from an interview with Ashley King

KING was then transported to Houghton-le-Spring Police Office where at 11.35 am that day he was interviewed in the following manner by myself and D C Simpson

P1 "When we saw you last Saturday you told us that you didn't go out at all on the evening of Monday 4th November. Are you still saying that's true?"
K1 "Yes, I'm sure that's right."
P2 "It can be difficult thinking back Ash, so think very carefully, its very important."
K2 "Aye, I'm sure about that. I never left the house."
P3 "We've interviewed some people who say you were out that night?"
K3 "I don't think so."
P4 "Think very carefully about it, it's important."
K4 "I think that was the night we got the tyres, is that what you mean."
P5 "Tell us about it."
K5 "**Billy, Berti and Melley called for** us and we went up the bank and got some tyres."
P6 "What time was this?"
K6 "They came for us about **six o'clock**."
P7 "Who's Berti?"
K7 "I don't know his second name but **he's from Shiney**."
P8 "When you say you got some tyres, do you mean you stole them?"
K8 "Aye, I think so"
I then cautioned KING.
P9 "Where did you get the tyres from?"
K9 "**It's a place** next to the garage, its **near the pit**."
P10. "Do you know the name of the premises?"
K10. "**Tyre Services** I think, but I'm not sure."
(*The interview record continues for 3 more pages*)

There are several points which immediately strike the reader and which one assumes would have similarly struck the members of the jury, because this would have been the first time in the trial that they had heard the 'voice' of King as he had not yet given evidence.

Firstly, we note that, following the prose introduction, we are presented with what appears to be a verbatim account of what was said by both King and the interviewing officer. Secondly, we hear King not telling the truth at first. The interview begins with three denials that he had been out on the night of November 4th - answers K1-K3 - followed by a grudging admission that in fact he had - answer K4: "I think that was the night we got the tyres, is that what you mean". Shortly afterwards, in K8, he admits that, although he himself had used the neutral word 'got' he knew that he was in fact 'stealing' the tyres. Thirdly, the police officer is apparently very patient and good-natured in his questioning – he offers a let-out in P2 after the first denial, "It can be difficult thinking back Ash, so think very carefully", he uses the diminutive address form "Ash" instead of "Ashley" and doesn't directly contradict King, but rather coaxes the truth out of him, through P3 and P4.

Although trial verdicts are decided on evidence, often the value of an individual piece of evidence depends on the credibility of the witness - indeed judges often instruct members of the jury to assess the credibility of witnesses when considering their evidence. In these early exchanges we can see King coming across as untrustworthy, as someone who needs to have the truth gradually teased out of him. At the same time the police officer is seen in a much better light, as a kindly patient man. It was therefore something of a surprise to me to discover that this text is not a contemporaneous verbatim record of the interview at all, but rather a persuasive and crucially deceptive dramatization, which had been in a very literal sense *made up* much later from minimal *trigger notes*. The opening of the actual trigger notes is presented below in the original layout:

Text 1b – The Original Police Trigger Notes

6pm Left house called for Billy Waugh &Melvin Waugh + (Berty) from Shiney Row
TO TYRES Place BY PIT (TYRE SERVICES?)

(These notes continue for 15 more lines but contain nothing else that is relevant to the extract under consideration.)

A quick glance at Text 1a above, where I have highlighted in bold the parts derived directly from the trigger notes, shows just how little basis there was in the notes for the record presented in court and just how much of the record was (re)created by the police from either memory or imagination. A reading of the expansion of the notes into indirect speech, which I offer below as an alternative way of presenting the same trigger note information demonstrates just how much of the persuasiveness of Text 1a comes from the police dramatization.

Text 1c - A Monologue Expansion

King said he left home at 6pm and called for Billy Waugh, Melvin Waugh and Berty from Shiney Row. They went to a tyres place near the pit, which may be (called) Tyre Services.

Gone are the two contrasting characters - the shifty King and the kindly policeman, gone the biblical triple denial - and all that remains is an uninteresting short narrative of events with no confession to theft and none of the evaluation of character and action which makes the dramatization so persuasive for the reader/listener. This is not an unusual and

isolated instance of persuasive dramatisation – indeed the same case yields many other instances when details which may or may not have been part of the original interview were added or changed in the transition between trigger notes and final evidential interview record.

This discussion provides a sufficient basis to argue that the collection of linguistic evidence must be rigorously controlled. The most carefully produced verbatim contemporaneous notes will always be inaccurate and all too often decisions about what to include and what to omit, will make the record irremediably unfaithful. The only way to ensure that courts have access to uninterpreted locutions is through audio or video recording. In Britain, since the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, (PACE) the police have been required, whenever possible, to make contemporaneous audio recordings of significant interviews. The evidence in favour of tape-recording is overwhelming, so linguists who work in the vast majority of countries where the taping and subsequent transcription of interviews is not standard practice, have all the necessary ammunition to mount a reasoned campaign to introduce it.

Even then, as Haworth (2010) demonstrates, tape recording doesn't solve all the problems because most of the time the UK legal process works not with the audio record, but instead with written transcripts of interviews, transcripts that are made by civilians employed by the police and who sometimes make significant errors. One of the interviews used in the trial of serial killer Dr Harold Shipman contained this exchange

P: You don't keep drugs in your surgery, is that correct?
S: I don't keep any drugs, if you are talking about controlled drugs

However, the transcript used in court had Shipman transcribed as saying instead the potentially incriminating

S: I've **given you** drugs. Are you talking about controlled drugs

When such interview transcripts are used as evidence in court they are 'performed' by the police officer who conducted the interview and the prosecuting lawyer who may compound mistranslations with misreadings and meaning-changing intonation mis-choices. At the moment it appears that the vast majority of lawyers and judges either don't realise what is happening or worse don't care. This is a major battle still to be fought.

But the judicial situation can be much worse - Gibbons (2001) reports on the court system in Chile where, he notes, most of the judgments are reached on the basis of judges reading written reports of interviews with witnesses - *relato*s - which have been produced by court officials. Often, as in the case on which Gibbons focussed, there are no client lawyers present at the interview. The relator questions the witness and produces a written first person statement on behalf of the witness which in this case was 'typed up … on a word processor as the witness spoke'. As one would expect, things the relator regarded as unimportant were omitted and so were not available for the judges to even consider and worse, factual mistakes and misinterpretations occurred in the relato. Gibbons happened to tape-record this particular interview, so we know what was actually said, although of course the judge who reached a decision on the case didn't.

There are similar problems with court proceedings; in a few countries they are audio-recorded or taken down verbatim in shorthand, but in the majority of countries this does not occur - rather a summary of what was said is made, sometimes by a court official sometimes by the judge and that is the official record. This is unacceptable. Following his conviction an

accused may wish to appeal, arguing, for example, that the judge mis-directed the jury, or misunderstood a crucial piece of evidence or that an interpreter interpreted wrongly, so it is essential that there is an indisputable, independent interference-free record of what was actually said, not a partial version, produced by one interested party.

However, there is still no perfect system; even in Britain, where audio recording is now standard practice, access is restricted by money. Private companies have been given the sole right to record trials and they then charge substantial sums for copies of their official transcripts - people have open access to these paid-for transcripts, but they do not have a right to make their own transcripts from the audio recordings. Equality before the law is a fiction - while all people are theoretically equal, some will always be more equal than others.

1. Professional-lay communication problems

The right to trial by jury is seen in some countries, particularly English-speaking ones, as a fundamental human right - indeed, in the States it is guaranteed by the 7th Amendment - while in other countries it is considered risky if not bizarre for a person's fate to be put into the hands of untrained and potentially badly educated laymen. Certainly, trial by jury may not in itself guarantee a fair trial or at least not a safe verdict and that for purely linguistic reasons.

In any jury trial the judge must instruct the jury at an appropriate point about those aspects of the law that they need to be aware of in order to reach their verdict. This instruction typically occurs after all the evidence has been presented and after the prosecution and defence lawyers have concluded their closing statements and just before the jury retire to consider their verdict. Dumas (2000:65) argues persuasively that this in itself is a questionable practice, because 'jurors often form their opinions about the proper outcome of the case well before they are instructed in the applicable law'. However, with some jury instructions it wouldn't matter at what point they were presented, because they are irremediably incomprehensible.

There will, of course, always be linguistic problems with instructing a jury. On the one hand the judge wants to be sure that s/he has instructed the jury correctly, so that s/he is not vulnerable to an appeal against conviction on the grounds of misdirection, but on the other hand s/he needs to communicate with twelve good (wo)men and true who are likely to have real difficulty with the intricacies of legal language. In the US judges have traditionally placed more emphasis on the accuracy rather than the communicability of their instructions and use so-called 'pattern jury instructions' which are pre-prepared agreed textualisations, usually produced by committees. The judge reads out the relevant instruction(s) to the jury and typically refuses any requests to explain or gloss the instruction. There are recorded instances of juries returning to the judge saying they cannot understand the instruction(s) and the judge simply reading out the instruction(s) again.

Had you been on a jury in Tennessee in the 1990's you would have been instructed on the meaning of the crucial term 'reasonable doubt' by the judge reading the following text:

> *Reasonable doubt* is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a captious, possible or imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offence.

> [footnote omitted] (*Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions—Criminal* (West 4th ed. 1995) 7:14, quoted in Dumas 2002)

You might like to try reading this aloud to a friend to check its intelligibility. Even though you have had the benefit of seeing the instruction in a written form and have been able to read it more than once if you so wished, I suspect you are not confident that you fully understand it. There is significant grammatical complexity in some of the clauses and the nominal groups and there is a preference for the nominalisation of processes – 'investigation', 'proof', inability', 'certainty' – and for the use of passive and agentless constructions – 'engendered', 'demanded' 'convict' 'required'. There are also major difficulties with the meaning of individual lexical items -'engendered', captious', 'moral' 'proposition', requisite' and 'constitute', to list only the most obvious. It is hard to see how a jury could reliably reach a verdict on the basis of this instruction.

In some US states the jury is asked not simply to reach a verdict on guilt but also to impose a penalty on the guilty party and there are suggestions that some death penalties have been imposed as a result of a basic misunderstanding by jury members. Levi (1993) reports a lexical analysis of a set of jury instructions concerned with imposing the death penalty, which she undertook as part of an expert report in the case of *US ex rel. James P Free Jr v Kenneth McGinnis et al*. She was asked to express an opinion on the question 'How well could [the language of the jury instructions] have served its purpose in communicating clearly to the jury the legal concepts they needed to understand for sentencing in a capital case?' (p10). The instructions in question were (the highlighting in bold is mine):

> If you unanimously find from your consideration of all the evidence that there are no mitigating factors **sufficient** to **preclude** the imposition of a sentence of death then you should return a verdict imposing a sentence of death.
>
> If, on the other hand, you do not unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors **sufficient** to **preclude** the imposition of a sentence of death then you should return a verdict that the sentence of death should not be imposed

In considering *sufficient* Levi focused on the inherent vagueness of the word. She pointed out that *sufficient*, has only a contextually derivable meaning and that the instructions themselves did not give an individual juror any help on how to decide what would count as a sufficient mitigating factor in the particular situation of sentencing someone to death. In addition there was the doubt as to whether a single factor, that was perceived to be sufficient, but only so perceived by a single juror, would in itself be 'sufficient to preclude'. According to the law it would, but would it be according to the text and if it was could an average reader have successfully deduced this?

In considering *preclude* Levi's approach was different; she pointed out that, while this word did have a context-independent meaning, most of the jurors were unlikely to have known it. She supported this assertion by testing some fifty undergraduate students attending one of her courses and found that only three students were able to provide the correct definition. Her conclusion was that there were grave doubts as to the comprehensibility of these instructions.

These two examples are sufficient to demonstrate convincingly that there is a serious problem with many jury instructions and that the best way to resolve such communication problems is not retrospectively, case by case, when there seems to be *prima facie* evidence of a miscarriage of justice. Practical research by Elwork et al as long ago as 1982 showed

clearly the need for revision. They asked groups of volunteers to be members of mock juries. These juries watched a video of a real trial and at the end some of the juries were given the same instructions as the jurors in the original trial, while other juries were given instructions written according to Plain English principles. When the jurors' were questioned afterwards about legal points which had been covered in the instructions, those who had had the rewritten instructions performed almost twice as well, achieving 78% correct responses as opposed to 40% by those who had had the unsimplified instructions. How many people would want to submit to a jury trial if they knew that?

However, all is not lost. Over a period of eight years Peter Tiersma, a law professor with a doctorate in linguistics, worked with a panel of lawyers and judges in California converting all of the state's criminal and civil jury instructions into a more communicative form. The results were published in 2005 and here are their versions of the two instructions we examined above:

> Proof beyond reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. (2010:260)

> A mitigating circumstance or factor is any fact, condition or event that makes the death penalty less appropriate as a punishment, even though it does not legally justify or excuse the crime. A mitigating circumstance is something that reduces the defendant's blameworthiness or otherwise supports a less severe punishment. A mitigating circumstance may support a decision not to impose the death penalty. *Calcrim* 763 para 3

> To return a verdict of either death, or life without the possibility of parole, all 12 of you must agree on that verdict. *Calcrim* 766 para 7

There are important lessons to be drawn here – linguistic analysis is not enough, one also needs access to the powerful elite who are able to effect change. Tiersma had both the academic status and the legal training to gain access to this group and then the linguistic knowledge to influence the changes. However, this is a battle won so far in only one state; there is much work still to be done by American linguists.

In Britain things are altogether more informal – judges are happy, indeed anxious to explain, and often use their own examples in order to be sure the jury understands. Even 'reasonable doubt' has disappeared from the judges instructions in most courts and been replaced by 'sure'. The British specimen directions on proof are

> 'How does the prosecution succeed in proving the defendant's guilt? The answer is -- by making you sure of it. Nothing less than that will do. If after considering all the evidence you are sure that the defendant is guilty, you must return a verdict of 'Guilty'. If you are not sure, your verdict must be 'Not Guilty'.' (Judicial Studies Board 2005, cited in Heffer 2005: 165)

2. By their language shall ye know them – asylum seekers

Asylum seekers are people who claim to be political refugees. The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as someone who

> ‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country...’ (quoted in Eades and Arends 2004:179.)

In 2007, the last year for which UN figures were available at the time of writing, there were some 650,000 applications for asylum or refugee status. As this status has significant benefits it is often claimed by those who do not in fact have the right to it. In many Western European countries as well as in Australia and New Zealand there is currently perceived to be a major problem with *economic* refugees, people applying for *political* asylum by falsely claiming to be persecuted residents of countries where the political situation makes asylum applications legitimate under the Geneva Convention. So, for example English-speaking Africans may falsely claim to be persecuted Christians from the south of Sudan, or refugees from conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone or Somalia. Governments are obviously anxious to identify bogus applicants and repatriate them, so all claims have to be investigated and justified and frequently the linguistic evidence is crucial.

> In assessing claims for asylum, the main issue for the determining authority (typically the immigration department) is to ascertain whether the applicant has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted” in their home country. Thus, in immigration interviews applicants [are asked to] recount their experiences in their home country, which have often involved the persecution of themselves or of family members. (Eades 2010: 412)

Given that there is normally a strong connection between the way people speak and their place of origin, several governments have, not unreasonably, decided to make language testing part of the investigative process. This whole area has come to be known by the acronym LADO (Language Analysis in the Determination of Origin). There have, however, been problems with both the initial collection of the relevant linguistic data – sometimes applicants have had to be interviewed in a *lingua franca* for example English or French – as well as with the subsequent analysis of the language samples. The linguistic determination of origin has typically been based on the analysis of an audio recording made of the given asylum speaker when s/he was being interviewed by another person whose main concern was eliciting non-linguistic evidence of origin – in other words, with the notable exception of Switzerland (Baltisberger and Favaro, 2007), the samples analysed by the language analysts have not been collected by them nor even collected with the subsequent linguistic analysis in mind. Even worse the analysts all too often are chosen because they are native speakers of the language in question rather than because they have any academic linguistic training.

To list just a few of the problems that have arisen with this system: analysts have sometimes wrongly assumed:

a) that a speaker has only one dialect - some of the analysts appear to be insufficiently aware of the prevalence of bilingualism and the degree of language variation;
b) that a speaker living for a period in another country will not acquire some of the basic local vocabulary – in other words an individual lexical item is not indicative of origin;
c) that languages are coterminous with national borders - this is simply not true. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan and contiguous regions in Africa clearly have

> linguistically porous borders and the distribution of the languages does not correspond to arbitrarily constructed political borders. In Africa, for instance, the current political borders are mainly the result of the various colonising European nations having carved up territories according to administrative convenience rather than according to the pre-existing and long-term linguistic and ethnic boundaries of the colonised peoples. To give just one example of a phenomenon that is common across the whole of the continent, speakers of Fula ended up in both French-speaking Guinea and English-speaking Sierra Leone.

In 2004, in an attempt to ameliorate the situation, an international group of nineteen linguists from six countries published a set of guidelines to inform both government agencies and the lawyers who work with asylum seekers, about LADO-relevant linguistic issues, particularly about how to evaluate the linguistic reports, (Arends et al 2004).

Among their recommendations were

- that language analysts should not be expected to determine national origin, nationality or citizenship at all, although they could be asked to comment on the country of *socialisation* of a speaker. Instead, it was argued, their reports should be fed into a subsequent decision making process which put together the linguistic with the non-linguistic information;
- that language analysis must be done only by qualified linguists because "the expertise of native speakers is not the same as the expertise of linguists" (p 263);
- that analysts should have specific classificatory criteria in advance of case work, that they should only express their degree of certainty in their opinions semantically and not statistically and that they should be willing to state clearly when classification in a given case is impossible;
- that analysts should be very wary indeed when the language of the interview is not (one of) the first language(s) of the interviewee, particularly when the interviewer is using a related but distinct dialect which may cause the interviewee to 'accommodate' and use items s/he would not normally use.

In addition to producing these Guidelines, which are now being quoted in evidence in individual appeals against the refusal of asylum, the linguistic community is now actively questioning not only the reliability of the current procedures but also the professional competence of many of the testers. Criticism has been levelled against the Swedish Immigration Authority in particular, which has delegated the work to two private companies, Eqvator and Sprakab, which have also done work for the Australian and several European governments. Eades, Fraser, Siegel, McNamara, & Baker (2003) focusing on analyses of Afghans applying for asylum in Australia produced by Eqvator, concluded that the staff lacked the expertise necessary to construct an informed judgment, arguing that their main qualification to undertake the classification was simply an ability to speak the language; they had no training in linguistics and insufficient sociolinguistic knowledge. For example Eades et al. (2003) point out that although the firm claimed to be able to distinguish between Afghan and Pakistani speakers of Hazaragi, in fact "the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has had very little linguistic study" and thus, until fundamental linguistic research has been undertaken, it will be impossible to determine whether a Hazaragi from Afghanistan can be reliably distinguished linguistically from one from Pakistan or indeed even from Iran, where it is also spoken.

Conclusion

What I have tried to do in this article is to give a few illustrated examples of areas where linguists have contributed to changing the legal-linguistic world, hoping thereby to encourage my readers to do likewise. There are many more examples of successes in Coulthard and Johnson, (2007 chapters 6-9), but even so, innumerable mountains remain for those with a critical linguistic perspective who would like to try to move one.

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