

## TOURISM IN THE SUSTAINED HEGEMONIC NEOLIBERAL ORDER

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**Abstract:** Sustainable Development (SD) has become a unifying concept that transcends conflicting discourses. Over time it has become a fundamental political concept in the current world order. This paper explores the structures that (re)produce the world-system in which tourism is embedded. Following Fletcher's (2011) demonstration of tourism as a force of capitalist expansion, we will refer to the concept of the International Political Economy (IPE) to discuss how the world-system has been structured and institutionalized. It appears fundamental to understand this path to face the actual IPE construct in which we see tourism grow year after year in scale and scope. The shift towards neoliberalism as a main narrative has been vastly discussed (Harvey, 2007; Brown, 2015; Mosedale, 2016) but we will turn to the Hardt and Negri's *Theory of Empire* (2000). We will first consider the question of how sustainable development, within its virtuous global reach, is in fact, a primarily Empire-like discourse, especially when it is carried by International deterritorialized institutions. The second question we will address is the role of tourism in the moments of Empire processes of transformation and globalisation. We conclude that tourism is contributing to the main process of globalization and the market dominance of neo-liberalism expressed in Empire. If there is different strand of thought and research that advocates tourism and sustainable development as a locus of change in the economic and world system, it has only had limited success at the margins, while discourses of globalization and mass tourism keep going strong.

**Keywords:** Tourism industry, International political economy, Empire, Biopower.

## O TURISMO NA ORDEM HEGEMONICA NEOLIBERAL SUSTENTADA

**Resumo:** O Desenvolvimento Sustentável (SD) tornou-se um conceito unificador que transcende discursos conflitantes. Com o tempo, tornou-se um conceito político fundamental na atual ordem mundial. Este artigo analisa as estruturas que (re)produzem o sistema mundial no qual o turismo está inserido. Seguindo a demonstração feita por Fletcher (2011) sobre o turismo como uma força de expansão capitalista, vamos nos referir ao conceito de economia política internacional (IPE) para discutir como o sistema mundial foi estruturado e institucionalizado. Parece fundamental entender esse caminho para enfrentar a construção real da IPE, na qual vemos o turismo crescer ano após ano em escala e escopo. A mudança para o neoliberalismo como uma narrativa principal tem sido amplamente discutida (Harvey, 2007; Brown, 2015; Mosedale, 2016), mas vamos nos voltar para a *Teoria do Império* de Hardt e Negri (2000). Consideraremos primeiramente a questão de como o desenvolvimento sustentável, dentro de seu alcance global virtuoso, é, na verdade, um discurso primariamente de império, especialmente quando é levado por instituições internacionais desterritorializadas. A segunda questão que abordaremos é o papel do turismo nos momentos dos processos de transformação e globalização do Império. Concluímos que o turismo está contribuindo para o principal processo de globalização e o domínio do mercado do neoliberalismo expresso no Império. Se existe uma linha diferente de pensamento e pesquisa que defende o turismo e o desenvolvimento sustentável como um locus de mudança no sistema econômico mundial, isso só teve sucesso marginalmente, enquanto os discursos da globalização e do turismo de massa continuam fortes.

**Palavras-chave:** Indústria do turismo; Economia política internacional; Império; Biopoder.



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## EL TURISMO EN EL ORDEN NEOLIBERAL HEGEMONICO SOSTENIDO

**Resumen:** El Desarrollo Sostenible (SD) se ha convertido en un concepto unificador que trasciende discursos en conflicto. Con el tiempo, se ha convertido en un concepto político fundamental en el orden mundial actual. Este artículo analiza las estructuras que (re)producen el sistema mundial en el que está integrado el turismo. Después de la demostración de Fletcher (2011) del turismo como una fuerza de expansión capitalista, nos referiremos al concepto de economía política internacional (IPE) para analizar cómo se ha estructurado e institucionalizado el sistema mundial. Parece fundamental comprender este camino para enfrentar el verdadero constructo de IPE en el que vemos que el turismo crece año tras año en escala y alcance. El cambio hacia el neoliberalismo como narrativa principal se ha discutido ampliamente (Harvey, 2007; Brown, 2015; Mosedale, 2016), pero pasaremos a la *Teoría del Imperio* de Hardt y Negri (2000). En primer lugar, consideraremos la cuestión de cómo el desarrollo sostenible, dentro de su alcance global virtuoso, es de hecho, un discurso primordialmente parecido al Imperio, especialmente cuando es llevado por instituciones internacionales desterritorializadas. La segunda pregunta que abordaremos es el papel del turismo en los momentos de los procesos de transformación y globalización del Imperio. Concluimos que el turismo está contribuyendo al proceso principal de globalización y al dominio del mercado del neoliberalismo expresado en el Imperio. Si existe una línea diferente de pensamiento e investigación que aboga por el turismo y el desarrollo sostenible como un locus de cambio en el sistema económico mundial, solo ha tenido un éxito limitado en los márgenes, mientras que los discursos sobre la globalización y el turismo de masas continúan siendo sólidos.

**Palabras clave:** Industria del turismo; Economía política internacional, Imperio, biopoder.

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

Sustainable Development (SD), as noted by Jacob (1999) nearly twenty years ago, has become a unifying concept that transcends conflicting discourses. Over time it has become a fundamental political concept in the current world order. Consensus on the apparently irrefutably virtuous nature of the concept reached new heights, in spite of nearly two decades of critique, in 2015, with the unanimous acceptance of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) at the general assembly of the United Nations.

Although UN documents tend to be highly enthusiastic on the matter, the mitigated results of the previous Millennium Development Goals call for some caution. Rather than evaluate the actual impacts and reach of the UN SDG goals, *this paper proposes to explore the structures that (re)produce the world-system in which tourism is embedded.*

Following Fletcher's (2011) demonstration of tourism as a force of capitalist expansion, we will refer to the International Political Economy (IPE) to discuss how the world-system has been structured and institutionalized. It appears fundamental to understand this path to face the actual IPE construct in which we see tourism grow year after year in scale and scope. Using the regime theory, we will unfold the rules and conditions of the emergence of the world system within the era of development (1945-1989), its role in the transformation of politics and capital, and the evolution of international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).

In 1989, the world system underwent a major transformation due to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the concurrent acceleration of the neo-liberal revolution that was taking place in the core countries of the hegemonic western economic system, the United States and the United Kingdom. This transformation greatly impacted the IPE and was particularly influential with regards to the narratives at play in the construction of meaning in this new era. The shift towards neoliberalism as a main narrative has been vastly discussed (Harvey, 2007; Brown, 2015; Dachary, 2015; Mosedale, 2016) but we will turn to the Hardt and Negri's Theory of Empire (2000), to expose the transformations of the process of the (re)production of society in the post-1989 global order and global market. With a first glance at the pillar of the Theory of Empire, we will focus on the

three moments of (re)production of the Empire: *integration, diversification and management.* This three moments working simultaneously and dialectically expose the changes from the post-war IPE Regime, to the transformation of Nation-State in the embedded liberalism to finally arrive at the Empire.

Then we will consider the question of how sustainable development, within its virtuous global reach, is in fact, a primarily Empire-like discourse, especially when it is carried by International deterritorialized institutions of the IPE. The second question we will address is the role of tourism in the moments of Empire processes of transformation and globalisation. This deconstruction of will leads us *to propose a composite reading where tourism in the hegemonic project of sustainability is a manifestation of capital accumulation (Fletcher, 2011) in a neo-liberal project (Mosedale, 2016).* This neo-liberal project, through biopolitics (Foucault, 1979; Hardt & Negri, 2000), is the foundation of a relational organization of social relationships in the politically diffused hegemony of the Empire via market governance (Brown, 2015). To begin, we will address the role and the condition of emergence of our IPE world-system.

## 2 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF) AS AN ARCHETYPE OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NEOLIBERALISM'S INTERNATIONAL REGIME

The political economy of international relations is part of a debate that, since the end of WWII, has generated several currents that focus on the role of the state, the growing influence of non-state actors and the ideologies and strategies associated with resource allocation (Gilpin 2016, 2001, Morton 2003, Agnew 1995, Cox 1995, Baldwin 1993).

Through a syncretic approach, we will illustrate the international political economy and the hegemonic role of some stakeholders in developing a model of global economic organization. Our approach will be based on the contributions of the neorealist current, for which we will provide a brief historical review, in order to identify the key structural elements of the international economic system which conditions the orientation of the flows and the asymmetry of trade. This step will be supplemented by a critical reading that highlights the role of tourism in this context.

For neorealists, an international regime is composed of rules, norms, principles and procedures that help to establish agreements between stakeholders, based on the collective interests that bring them together (Keohane, 2005 1982, 1980). Consequently, within a neorealist framework, the postwar economic order instituted by the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 constituted an international regime.

In the neorealist posture of Regime Theory, the principal members of the international system are formed by sovereign states, even though the dynamics of these regimes are largely influenced by private entities (Young, 1999; 1991; 1982). The Bretton Woods Agreement responded to these characteristics and institutionalized the post-war compromise by creating organizations that established and responded to the needs of a new regime (Ruggie, 2008, 2002, 1982).

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one of these institutions. If we consider the IMF to be a specific regime that exercises the mandate entrusted to it at the time of its creation, it is clear that it is not the only player at work in the international financial and monetary sectors. For example, central banks also play an important role in international financial and monetary relations, and the World Bank, like the World Trade Organization (WTO), is closely linked to IMF activities. Multinational firms, investment banks and investment companies are also key players that influence the magnitude and effects of financial and monetary flows.

However, of all of the entities at work in these sectors, only the IMF is an original creation of the Bretton Woods Agreement, and so, no organization had ever played this specific role until the new economic order of 1944 was created. The creation of the IMF responded to an unmet need, that of managing, financing and controlling international financial and monetary exchanges, a role that had, until that point, never been institutionalized. In the following lines we will show how the creation of the IMF represents the institutionalization of neoliberalism as an international regime. It is the birth of a truly deterritorialized international institution.

Oran R. Young (1999, 1991) distinguishes three types of regime, according to how they are formed:

spontaneous, negotiated and imposed. Although the elements that led to its development as a regime were formally negotiated and adherence to the IMF's regime is voluntary (which is, in effect, proof that members freely abide by its operating rules), the implementation of its normative structure is not the result of negotiations between all of its members. This reading joins the current of the heterodox political economy carried by Stephen Gill (1991, Gill and Law, 1988) and Robert W. Cox (1995) which suggests that within hegemony

“dominance is obscured by achieving an appearance of acquiescence [...] [It is] an internalized coherence which has most probably arisen from an externally imposed order but has been transformed into an intersubjectively constituted reality” (Cox, 1994: 366).

The Bretton Woods Agreement and the resulting international organizations (IMF and World Bank) are negotiated regimes, certainly, but they were negotiated by two major economic powers eager to initiate a new economic order to meet their interests first and foremost.

The two powers in question are evidently the United Kingdom and the United States. The first, upon realizing the impossibility of maintaining its lead role in hegemonic power, one that it had occupied throughout the 19th century, had to transfer leadership to the second, which has occupied the role *de facto* since the end of WWI, but more completely since the end of WWII. The transition was achieved through mutual understanding, due to a common generative grammar, a set of principles and norms that form a common worldview for a group of states and that serves to regulate international relations (Ruggie, 2002, 1982).

The current generative grammar emanates from a worldview based on political and economic liberalism. It is thanks to this common generative grammar that the transfer of control from one power to another has been possible under conditions of cooperation and recognition of mutual interest. Under these conditions, the regime established in 1944, even if it has the appearance of being negotiated, cannot be dissociated from the explicit participation of the United States as a stabilizing hegemonic power.

The theory of hegemonic stability states that the concentration of power in the hands of a dominant

state facilitates the development of a “strong” regime and, on the contrary, the fragmentation of power is associated with the collapse of the regime. Concentration of power thus produces an effect of stability and continuity, and this is precisely the role played by the United States in shaping and maintaining the post-war economic order (Keohane, 2012; 2002; 1982).

This is what Oran R. Young (1999, 1982) calls “de facto imposition,” where the dominant actor is able to promote institutional arrangements that are favorable to it, by applying flexible forms of leadership and manipulating various incentives. It was precisely the role played by the United States in shaping the post-war economic order that led, not to real negotiation between the two Anglo-Saxon powers, but to imposition without any major concessions, from the White Plan to the Keynes Plan. Young (1999, 1982) points out that some plans that offer the appearance of being negotiated regimes are, actually, de facto orders.

The negotiations behind the development of the plan are often heavily influenced by an unequal distribution of bargaining power. And even if a negotiated order is fair in principle, in several cases (the IMF included), the establishment of the regime or its management is based on an unequal power relationship. In this sense, we affirm that the Bretton Woods regime did not result from genuine negotiation among the actors that compose it and that although its membership remains voluntary, the regime is in fact imposed. While it is true that this regime is not imposed by force, the refusal to subscribe to the international economic structures that underlie it (disconnection) has become increasingly difficult since the neoliberal counter-revolution, even impossible since the fall of Berlin Wall (Todaro, 1989).

The IMF has been able to weather multiple political and economic crises over the past 75 years as it represents the archetype of the institutionalization of neo-liberalism and, although it is no longer as influential as it was when it was initially created, it continues to contribute to the reproduction of a relationship regime based on the hegemonic position of the United States in the aftermath of WWII.

## 2.1 The Main Factors Behind the Creation of the IMF as a Regime

The IMF was born of a “compromise” between the UK-backed Keynes Plan and the USA’s White Plan, both devised to increase international monetary and financial cooperation to avoid the emergence a new world conflict (Ruggie, 1982). The Keynes Plan, designed by the British economist John Maynard Keynes, proposed the creation of an international bank, the International Clearing Union, whose monetary unit, the Bancor, would be granted in credit to deficit member states. The White Plan, developed by the USA’s lead negotiator, Harry Dexter White, in a way, advocated the return to the gold standard, by the creation of an international currency, the unitas, which was neither more nor less than a dollar standard convertible into gold.

The Keynes Plan, considered by the Americans to be too expansionary, was strongly motivated by the intention of the British to revive their economic activity. The White Plan highlighted the dominant role of the United States, which at that time had two-thirds of the world’s gold reserves. The different interests underlying the two plans may have sparked some debate, but they nevertheless had several points in common, such as the rejection of bilateralism, the rejection of discriminatory practices, the necessity of monetary cooperation and the search for control over the international movement of capital (Fontanel, 2005, 1981). The Bretton Woods Agreement is therefore the result of a compromise that was advantageous for the United States, even though, in hindsight, Keynes’s ideas have had a long-lasting and undeniable impact on the economic policies of capitalist states.

The IMF is one of the institutions resulting from this compromise. It lays the foundations for the post-war international monetary system, which is based on the following objectives, drawn from Article 1 of its statutes:

“[...] to manage, finance and control the international economic order, by promoting the following: international monetary cooperation; the harmonious growth of international trade; the improvement of exchange rate stability; the establishment of a multilateral system for the settlement of current transactions and the elimination of exchange restrictions that hinder international trade; and by reducing the duration and degree of disequilibrium affecting the balance of payments of the member countries, by making financial resources available to them for a limited period (Fontanel, 1981 : 100).

Through these objectives, the IMF is committed to promoting the liberalization of trade and, through the mission at the origin of its creation, it participates in a greater integration of its members into the capitalist world economy.

## 2.2 The Rules, Standards and Decision-Making Processes that Condition the IMF as a Regime and the United States as a Hegemonic Power

The collective interests that bring states together in the IMF concern, as we have said, the rejection of bilateralism and the search for stable international cooperation in the financial and monetary fields. Heterodox political economy suggests that states are a result of, influence and are influenced by the constantly changing social forces that shape the resulting forms of power and their possible reproduction (Morton 2003, Cox 1995). We will return to this dialectic in the course of the article after having first analyzed the “structural” capacity of an institution such as the IMF to produce a discourse on the problems and solutions associated with the political economy, thus contributing to the consolidation of the hegemonic role of certain stakeholders.

As Keohane's definition supports, the IMF is composed of particular rules and standards that govern its operation. As Regime Theory suggests, admission to the IMF is restricted to nation-states. The “membership resolution” establishes a new member's share, which in turn determines their membership contribution, the amount and the method of circulation it is allowed, and the number of votes it has. The hegemonic position of the United States, to which we have referred, is reflected in the IMF in the number of votes proportional to the quota assumed by the country. Since its creation, the United States has always been the country with the largest number of votes (and not the majority), giving it unparalleled influence within the structures of the institution.

The structure of the IMF is defined by the first section of Article XII of its statutes. It is made up of a Board of Governors, an Executive Board, a Managing Director, and the staff necessary for its operation. Although all member countries are represented on the Board of Governors, which is mandated, once a year, to deal with the most important issues (new memberships, revision of shares, etc.), only a few

countries are assured a seat on the Fund's Executive Board, which, as the name implies, is the institution's true executive body. Until 2016, the five member countries with the highest share of quotas were entitled to seats on the Executive Board, thus securing the position of the United States.

These conditions have consistently reinforced the hegemonic role played by the United States since the institution's establishment. The IMF's mandate to join the collective interests of the international community and its operating structure have allowed it to definitively establish itself as an international regime with rules and principles that promote the liberalization of trade and economies, and the reproduction of a monetary and financial order based on capitalism and “market forces.” Moreover, it is not only a transformation of the economic regulation, it opens up a form of cultural transformation where market forces become extended to the fabric of society (Brown, 2015), the Structural Adjustment Policies of the IMF being a core transformation in this sense.

## 2.3 Post-War Liberalism and the End of a Model: structural adjustment policies as “instruments” of the Regime

Robert Gilpin (2016; 2001) argues that the Bretton Woods Agreement marked a fundamental shift in social, political and economic goals from those that preceded them. If, indeed, the period of the gold-exchange standard and the ideology of *laissez-faire* that prevailed in the 19th century subordinated domestic stability to international standards, the period between the two World Wars reversed these objectives. It seems, however, that the post-war economic order of Bretton Woods, attempted to bring the two ideologies together. This is what Gerard Ruggie (2008, 1982) calls the compromise of embedded liberalism.

This economic order could be summarized as follows: “directed” national economies operating in a “liberated” international economy. At the time, liberalism had to prevail in international trade to stem communism, but also to avoid another depression like that of the inter-war period, which had been caused by exacerbated protectionism and a shortage of economic exchanges. Although emerging from the neorealist current of international political economy, the heterodox mainstream recognizes the heuristic value of this notion in characterizing the prevailing

conditions of the time (Morton, 2003; Gill, 1991; Gill and Law, 1988).

The originality of the postwar compromise was that it simultaneously advocated for the liberalization of international trade policies and deliberately interventionist national economic policies. At the international level, the creation of the IMF, the World Bank, and, later on, the signing of the GATT and the creation of the WTO, represented the institutionalization of an international economic order based on the principles of liberalism. Therefore, from the beginning, there has been a certain contradiction within embedded liberalism, an approach that was greatly influenced by Keynes, particularly because of the parallel application of two models – liberalism abroad, and interventionism at the national level – making it difficult to consistently enforce the distinct rules that apply to each approach. Indeed, Keynes encouraged the state to intervene (and thus to borrow as needed) in order to make productive investments or to support income and consumption. The application of either of these policies was in any case aimed at creating full employment. It seems, however, that governments have applied both types of policies at the same time. Moreover, this expansionist strategy was based on the maintenance of rapid and sustained economic growth, as it had been since the end of the WWII and which “was now self-evident” in most countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1987).

By the end of the 1960s, however, at a time when economic performance seemed to be at its peak, certain obstacles threatening the sustainability of this growth emerged. In general, this period was marked, particularly in Europe, by the beginning of social changes (wage increases, for example) that gradually reduced company profit margins. At the international level, the end of the 1960s was characterized by a slowdown in the growth of world trade, which had been maintained at a high level since the implementation of the Marshall Plan and had favored the consolidation of liberalism through a growing interdependence between states. The main consequence of these changes in the international economic situation was the exacerbation of the budgetary imbalances that ultimately led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System when US dollar’s convertibility to gold was officially suspended in 1971 (Gilpin, 2001).

### 3 THE OIL CRISES: AT THE ORIGIN OF A NEW ECONOMIC ORDER

The 1970s marked the decline of the compromise of embedded liberalism as the world had known it for twenty-five years. The OECD notes that this period was marked by a lack of coherence between macro and microeconomic policies (Van Lennep, 1984). Under these shifting conditions, the principles of economic liberalism gradually began to take hold and influence national government policies in the same ways that they had operated on an international level.

While the first oil crisis of 1973-74 undeniably marked a decisive turning point in the break-up of economic growth, we believe, like Manuel Guitián (1981), that the oil crisis merely amplified strong, pre-existing inflationary pressure that led most countries into severe recessions. Indeed, the expansionary policies that states had been implementing since the aftermath of WWII and the growing interdependence of trade liberalization had made national economies vulnerable to changing international circumstances. The fourfold increase in the price of oil in the early 1970s aggravated the balance of payments deficit in non-oil-exporting countries and plunged them into accelerated debt. This indebtedness was all the more rapid as most countries, encouraged by the increased availability of easily accessible petrodollars on the financial markets, continued to apply the same inflationary policies throughout the 1970s.

Although the period between 1975 and 1979 marks the beginning of changes at this level in some countries, particularly among OECD members, few countries went so far as to change their economic policies. The second oil shock of 1979-82 put a definite end to the compromise of embedded liberalism by once again sending the international community into a deep economic slump. The diagnosis of a structural crisis in the Keynesian model was therefore due to a break in productivity growth, repeated inflationary pressures and a malfunction in the international monetary system that called for a readjustment of economic policies and the postulates on which they were based (Gilpin, 2016, 2001; Todaro, 1989).

If the IMF, in its international monetary and financial regime role, did not immediately disintegrate following the changes that led to the erosion of the dominance of the United States at the

international economic level, it is that the “de facto imposed order,” of which the IMF was the institutional incarnation, was still based on a compromise that brought together the interests of the major industrialized countries.

Thus, unlike empires that collapse with the decline of their domineering power, the IMF has maintained itself as a regime because it was the subject of a consensus, at least among the major capitalist powers. When there is an erosion in the concentration of economic power, as was the case between 1970 and 1980, and the “strength” of the international regime follows this same trend, John Gerard Ruggie (2002, 1982) argues that the plan’s “instruments” also have to change. However, as long as the relevance of the regime is maintained in the international community, there is no reason for the normative structure of the regime to change as well. In other words, the rules and procedures (instruments) will change, but the principles and norms (normative structure) will not.

Thus, in the same way that changes in the 1970s ordered an adaptation of the rules of the regime, which led to its statutes being amended twice, the conjunctures and the violent economic crisis of the early 1980s commanded a new adaptation of the “instruments” of this regime. The promotion of a neo-liberal ideology from this period began in earnest with this new stage, which marks the end of embedded liberalism.

The period also corresponds to an attempt to reaffirm the leadership of the two Anglo-Saxon powers at the origin of the post-war economic order and, in particular, to re-establish the United States as a hegemonic power. This attempt was accompanied by massive arms investments and the remarkable economic recovery of the Americans, financed largely by an increase in foreign debt, with the financial support of the Japanese.

If we consider these elements as an attempt by the United States to regain its hegemonic position on the international stage, Reaganomics, even if they managed to revive growth in the mid-1980s, have definitely contributed to the economic decline of the United States by saddling it with unprecedented levels of debt (Gilpin, 2016; Keohane, 2012, Gill & Law, 1988).

### 3.1 The Influence of Monetarist Theory and the Economics of Supply

The advent of the neoliberal “turn” raises the increased importance of theories such as monetarism and the supply economy as the new ideological bases of liberalism. For Monetarists at the Chicago School, such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, “the state must limit itself to providing a stable framework for market operations” (Beaud & Dostaler, 1993). We must therefore allow competition to determine the value of currencies and prices. The state lets market forces decide and the only actions required of it are programming the growth of the money supply according to demand and fighting inflation by raising interest rates. Supporters of the supply economy, such as George Gilder (2012, 1981), go even further by referring to Adam Smith and Malthus to condemn state social intervention. In fact, there is a call to reduce the state’s tax burden, for cutbacks in social policies and for radical economic deregulation.

These two main streams of economic thought form the basis of what has been called the neoliberal doctrine. It is clear, however, that this doctrine has never been applied in a totally orthodox way, in the same way that there has never been an orthodox application of Keynesianism, which has been unevenly applied in different countries. The two countries associated with the neoliberal turn are, of course, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the coming into power of Margaret Thatcher in 1979, and Ronald Reagan in 1981.

These two governments insisted, as soon as they arrived, on implementing shock therapy that focused on privatization, deregulation, and a reduced role of the state in restoring and enabling sustained growth. It also establish free-market and competition as core values, changing the role of nation- state but also of private stakeholders, moving towards a privatization not only of many functions of the State but also of the very basis of life and its reproduction, like health, education and security, the needs of the market, especially of the transnational corporations, become the imperative of development and policy-making (Brown, 2015; Harvey, 2007).

The American and British approach led to economic adjustment measures at the international level. Indeed, if the major Western countries realized that they could no longer encourage an expansionist model without sinking indefinitely into debt, it is clear

that the Third World countries were not in a better position to reproduce another ten years of interrupted growth, a condition considered essential for the development of their economies (Killick & Sutton, 1982). It was therefore necessary to adjust (IMF, 1989).

Although some countries began adjusting their economies in the 1970s, it was only in the early 1980s that the IMF emerged as the main proponent of the international neoliberal economic model (IMF, 1987). Strongly influenced by the prominence of the United States in this institution, the IMF put forward adjustment programs aimed at restoring the macro-economic equilibrium of its member countries (Nelson, 1990). This economic adjustment, applied jointly by the IMF and the World Bank in the so-called “developing” countries, corresponds to a change in the “instruments” of the regime, and represents, for Nancy Bermeo (1990), a short-term objective of many facets of economic liberalization.

Adjustments rely on a small number of principles drawn from the liberal doctrine and neoclassical economic theory that can be summarized in three themes: comparative advantages, monetarism, and the privileged role of private enterprise. Trade liberalization is also part of the structural adjustment process. By eliminating quantitative restrictions and lowering tariffs, countries are encouraged to extrovert their economies and maintain their comparative advantages, which is reflected in the reproduction of an international division of labour.

All these structural change efforts aim to create greater economic openness and have come to overshadow the definition of economic liberalization, which represents generalization of the concepts of the market economy and contributes to the reproduction of the hegemonic position of the actors in the market who founded the international regime.

### **3.2 Empire or the Blueprint of a Decentered and Deterritorialized Political World**

It is in this historical and ideological context that the IMF and the World Bank, but also the World Tourism Organization and, more generally, the United Nations, encourage tourism, which presents a possible alternative to the problems of developing economies, characterized, *inter alia*, by a structural

deficit in their balance of payments. To this end, “the policy of encouragement led by the World Bank and its subsidiaries in the 1960s for the inclusion of tourism in development plans has convinced the countries still hesitant” (Sid Ahmed, 1987).

In addition, the many difficulties encountered in industrialization efforts and the slowing down of international aid have pushed the countries of the South to look for new sectors that require little capital and have the potential to generate more. Based on the noteworthy success of some European countries (like Spain and Portugal) that relied on tourism for new currency inflows to help rebuild their economies following WWII, the tourism sector seemed to be able to meet this development objective

Therefore, the neoliberal turn described earlier is also a transformation of the world system and how it (re)produces society (Dachary, 2015). Indeed, if tourism development as promoted by these international institutions is done through the relationship in which countries from the South accept the hegemony and sacrifice part of their independence and sovereignty, tourism is also a worldmaking activity (Holinshead et al. 2009) inside the reproduction of the new world system.

To describe this new world system that emerged after the Cold War, Hardt and Negri (2000) put forth the theory of the Empire, “an enigmatic totality of money, power and culture” (Balakrishnan, 2003). This work suggests that Empire is constructed on a decentering of power through a deterritorialization of politics and culture, to create a smooth space of power (Keucheyan, 2013). In this smooth space, the nation-states are transformed into tools of coordination of production and accumulation (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Keucheyan, 2013).

It is important to note that within this framework, the concept of empire is different from the imperial project. Empire is a large encompassing set of worldmaking processes that redefine the role of states, markets and cultures, while the imperial project was a competition between imperial nation-states who fragmented and exploited the territories under their control. This framework of analysis can be applied to look at the role of tourism in the world system, to investigate why sustainable development and tourism remain core discourses, and to understand the practices that reproduce such discourses.



The global stakeholders, for Hardt and Negri (2000), structure their power in three parts: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. The monarchical bodies include the United States as hegemon, the G8, international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank, and the implementors of the Washington Consensus. The aristocratic entities are primarily multinational corporations, but also nation-states, particularly those with average or weak power that can be restructured by the rules of the monarchic body and for the action of multinationals. Finally, the democratic bodies, that is, the UN and international NGOs, in the role of representing an international civil society. In this last group the UN play a particular role as norm and standard- setter, in a mostly voluntary manner (Weiss, 2015).

One of the main arguments of Empire is about the transformation of sovereignty. Hardt and Negri (2000) observed an emptying of the nation-state through the actions of international institutions and transnational corporations. This was done by transferring power to non-territorialized, even mobile, organisations at the macro-scale power level.

This re-composition of the international political economy system was built around the expansion of the global market. It also involved a return of transcendental power through constructed normative principles like growth, free-market, and sustainable development. Those principles act at the Empire level to strip the multitude of their immanent sovereignty and to empty the nation-state of part of its substance on an international level. This happens in three moments: *incorporation*, *differentiation* and *management*.

*Incorporation* is the moment where Empire flattens differences into a global form of consensus. It involves removing all conflictual subjectivities to bring the multitude into a smooth space of power where equal consensual directions replace genuine debate and discussion. This smooth space is built within a hegemonic universal, legal and economic order sustained by transcendental principles. For example, the community driven development advocated by the World Bank, which – in theory – aims to empower “the poor” to decide their own path for development (Schilcher, 2007), is a process that normalizes international principles as natural components of any actual path that can be chosen to by the poor and qualifies what being poor and poverty means.

The second phase is *differentiation*. Hardt and Negri (2010) present this phase as the celebration of differences. This celebration is done by conceptualising differences as cultural phenomena and emptying them of their political subjectivities. This emptying is done by the introduction of expanding sets of global recognition and market rules, especially within the international political economy institutions.

Here we borrow from Coulthard (2014), whose critique of recognition can be subsumed into Hardt and Negri’s point (2000). Coulthard explains that in the integration differentiation relationship, recognition works in two ways: first through empirical processes that integrate subjectivities within the set of rule of the Empire, giving them a frame to exist, therefore differentiating them; and secondly by transforming political subjectivities into cultural subjectivities within the Empire order, thereby stripping them of their conflictual political potential to create change and redefine the rules of social reproduction. This also happens as a potential commodification of culture within the global market.

The third phase is *management*. This phase is about management and hierarchization through the development of an economy of command (Hardt & Negri, 2010). The integration and differentiation within the Empire world-system requires more than mere cultural assimilation built on inside/outside and assimilation/exclusion dualities, instead, it operates by managing differential fluxes.

That this equation does not have a unique solution is not really a problem – on the contrary. Contingency, mobility, and flexibility are Empire’s real power. The imperial “solution” is not to negate or attenuate these differences, but rather to affirm them and arrange them into an effective apparatus of command (Hardt & Negri, 2010).

This effective apparatus is an integral part of the international political economy’s world system, and of the biopower involved in the (re)production of an expanding and encompassing market capitalism. By biopower we mean, along with Hardt and Negri:

an intensification and generalization of the normalizing apparatuses of disciplinarity that internally animate our common and daily practices, but in contrast to discipline, this control extends well outside the structured sites

of social institutions through flexible and fluctuating networks. (Hardt & Negri, 2000 : 23).

This control is also embedded in tourism as a social practice. Indeed, tourism involves discursive practices that control internalizing norms, values, prescriptions and proscriptions about what can be done where and by whom (Dann, 1996).

### 3.3 Sustainable Development in Empire

Sustainable development first appeared in the literature in 1980 in a UICN publication, but the concept gathered speed as a set of blurry normative principles built around an oxymoron with the 1987 publication of the Brundtland report. The success of sustainable development is rooted in its shift from the conservation of “nature” to the conservation of “growth with nature,” and in the fact that it rarely elicits questions about what actual needs are being addressed and whose needs growth is supposed to meet (Sachs, 1999).

It is not a mere coincidence that the era of sustainable development started at about the same time that the Eastern Bloc collapsed. In the face of a changing world, it offered a new narrative to sustain developmental policies and an entirely a new global narrative.

In fact, sustainable development is a typical Empire-like discourse. It is built on a globalized vision of the environment and society and it does not challenge the basis of the liberal world order of market expansion and growth (Sachs, 1999; Jacob, 1999). It offers a solution through a redistribution of growth in a broad deterritorialized discourse where ecological modernization is the solution to different inefficient culturally-based modes of production that harm the environment and society.

Society, embedded in the social pillar of sustainability, is also framed by a deterritorializing discourse of society as a large all-encompassing concept where it is a globalized community of human beings on spaceship earth. This excerpt from Barrett and Farina (2000) in their introduction to a special issue of *Bioscience* on economic and sustainability clearly conveys this construction of sustainable development:

The session provided an excellent opportunity to redefine such transdisciplinary concepts and approaches as sustainability and noospheric, or

total human ecosystem, management. Naveh (2000) suggests that the integration of ecology and economics should be a transdisciplinary goal of the total human ecosystem (Naveh & Lieberman 1994) during the new millennium. Barrett and Odum (2000) predict that humankind working with and residing within ecologically managed landscapes and global systems based on a mutualistic ecologic/economic currency (rather than on the concept of “perpetual growth and expansion”) will be achieved during the coming century (Barrett & Farina, 2000: 312).

Although this excerpt alludes to an alternative to perpetual growth and expansion, their discourse on total human ecosystem management refers to a totally integrated management of humanity as an ecological being. This transforms the sustainability issues from vague normative problems to be managed into the result of conflicting political subjectivities on nature, resources and the structures of exploitation.

Notwithstanding the fact that if such a total conception was desired at the time, it is the very perpetual growth and expansion of the capitalist economy that created this world-system through expansion and geographical division of labour (Harvey, 2007; Brown, 2015). The subsidiarity principle offers a way into place-based initiatives and policies but can be also seen as a differentiation moment where competing cultural preferences can be expressed in time and space, but always in a loop of integration, through management and international agreements and principles.

Regarding tourism and sustainability, Saarinen (2006) stresses the fact that notions of sustainability rarely go beyond the destination level; there are relatively few questions about the growth of the industry. The framing of sustainability is “more concerned with issues and processes limiting or affecting growth and the industry’s future” (Saarinen, 2007:1123). Thus, sustainable development in tourism has been integrated in continuity with the main narrative of development which is productivity, innovation and competitiveness (Jenkins & Schröder, 2013).

As seen with the unilateral adoption of the SDG, there has not been much of a response to the critiques that have been circulating since the first forays into the sustainable development discourse. There was a streak of red sustainability in the 90s (see

Bunkley, 1992), but by the turn of the century, discourses of sustainability as an opportunity to transform the very structure of the society that created the environmental crisis had mostly faded away. As Sharpley (2000:2) reiterated “the inherent ambiguity of the concept is, paradoxically, its strength.

It is evident, then, that a universally acceptable interpretation of sustainable development is unlikely to be forthcoming.” This fuzziness – the difficulty of measuring it, of telling where sustainability begins and ends – constitutes a veritable strength for SD issues; it incorporates discourses from expert debates and critical threshold indicators while removing political subjectivities from the debate.

According to Haughton et al. (2016), as soon as any contestation is recognized and reframed through sustainable development, its political capacity becomes limited. We are therefore in the front of an Empire-like discourse of development, facing consensual deterritorialized reframed politically as a management issue. In the tourism context, where we are facing an international industry based on mobility, development and culture, sustainability is mostly framed by the international agencies as a way to sustain the industry which will then create the environmental and social benefits (Fletcher, 2011). This call for a closer look at the role of tourism as a development strategy.

#### 4 TOURISM AS A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

To understand the importance of tourism, especially for the countries in the South, it is essential to place the tourism option in the overall development context. Given the various failures to generate savings and the failure of industrialization policies based on specialization (comparative advantages), problems related to financing, developing, and choosing appropriate industrial sectors to develop remain intact. In these conditions, tourism has often been a key sector for implementing structural adjustment in Southern countries (Dieke 2000, 1995).

Above all, the sector sets out to promote the country's “natural resources,” in the form of a favorable climate, an exotic landscape or access to the sea. The lack of resources and raw materials (mineral resources, for example), that characterizes several Third World countries, motivated them to opt for the tourism sector. In addition, so-called “developing”

countries have an advantage over the comparative costs of tourism goods and services. As prices are lower, these countries can be more competitive in the international tourism market, which encourages tourists to prefer them over industrialized countries for their holiday destinations.

It is also easier to “accumulate capital” thanks to the tourism sector, considering that the need to import investment goods for the development of this sector is lower than other industrial sectors. During the generally favorable economic period of the 1950s and 1960s, tourism appeared as a relatively simple means to obtain foreign exchange for the industrialization of the “poor countries,” in addition to being a privileged means of creating jobs (Sarrasin, 2013; Dieke, 2000).

The uncertain economic climate of the 1970s and 1980s, however, revealed the fragility of the tourism sector. The deterioration of the international economic situation resulted in a deterioration of the terms of trade, much to the detriment of the countries of the South. This breakdown, coupled with the appearance of political problems (terrorism, conflict in the Middle East, etc.) and environmental issues (pollution, climate change, etc.) presented an additional hindrance to the development of tourism (Sarrasin 2007, Dieke 2000, Morucci 1991).

In addition to doubts about the capacity of the sector to perfect the development of the host country, these conditions also highlighted some of tourism's undesirable effects, thus prompting the countries of the South to question not only their expectations of the sector, but also the concept of economic growth as the sole objective of development.

In fact, in the 1970s tourism ceased to be “the miracle economic activity... requiring only a minimal investment and providing the greatest possible level of currency earning” (Béjot, 1987: 2656). The constraints that limit or pervert the effects of international tourism on the development of countries are intrinsically tied to the “excessive dependence at all stages” on outside forces, from the development of reception infrastructures, to the management of resources in the marketing of hotel and tourism products, to the training of labour (Béjot 1987, Dieke 1995). This dependence is caused by the host country not having any control over the product and the tourist outlet and it is an all-too-common situation in so-called “developing” countries.

Thus, it appears that the previously identified benefits of tourism depend almost exclusively on relations with industrialized countries, that tourism is a part of the “element of a development strategy geared towards outside [...] that relies on aid, foreign investment, the import of technology and other relations with the capitalist countries” (Sid Ahmed, 1987: 403). In these conditions, the development of tourism depends as much on outside forces as any other export position (Briceño & Muñoz, 2015).

The interacting relationships between the countries favored by the world order with those who are not have remained unchanged, consequently, tourism does not give Southern countries any means to develop without sacrificing their economic and political independence (Sarrasin, 2013). It contributes to the emptying of the role of the Nation-State in the neo-liberal order, and as we will deconstruct, tourism is inherent part of the Empire system of privatization of development.

#### 4.1 Tourism and the Integration Phase

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, tourism growth has been phenomenal. In 1995, the UNWTO recorded 528 million international visitors (UNWTO, 2012) and in 2016, this figure had reached 1.322 million (UNWTO, 2017). That is, the number of tourists, not including the domestic tourists, more than doubled in 20 years. This was made possible by the strong integration of tourism as a global discourse, part of the neoliberal world order, particularly by international organizations like the UNWTO and the WTTC, the global travel industry, and the commercialization of nature and heritage using a Western universal template (Cater, 2006).

The role of the UNWTO is important in this global integration, as can be observed in the UNWTO global code of ethics for tourism. As Castenada (2012) pinpoints, this code is a blueprint for unfettered tourism development:

The application of these ideas amounts to creating a political struggle in which the asserted right to develop tourism without restrictions, restraints, and regulations, which is grounded in the asserted rights of tourists to sightsee, conflicts with the heritage ownership rights of cultural communities, stakeholders, and descendants (Castañeda, 2012 : 50).

This right given to tourists is the surface of the right for the private sector to make profit out of the non-market amenities that tourism feeds on. It also supports the unequal division of power and distributions of resources in host communities, especially in favor of local elite of the South and the peripheries (Cater, 2006).

Indeed, tourism integrates a wide array of material, immaterial, natural and cultural resources into that global world system. This is done through the discourses of sustainable development. In contrast, the activity-based tradition demonstrates the present and relatively widely accepted hegemonic idea of sustainability. It reflects the idea that tourism as (a tool for) development can contribute to sustainability, but it also strongly represents the industry's perspective, from which growth and its needs are conditions for justifying sustainability: the objective and driving force is to sustain tourism and its resource base for the future needs of the industry (Saarinen, 2006).

The interactions between global international tourism organisations and the private industry reveal the will to keep tourism growing and to integrate those flows at the global level. These same interactions contribute to decentering power as seen with the strength of large transnational stakeholders like airline conglomerates, hotel chains, cruise ship companies, AirBnB, travel guide publishers, and so on.

This was already in the making through the embedded liberalism. The case of the *Ile à la Vache in Haïti*, provides a good example of a national government changing its laws to attract private tourism investors. In this case, beyond development, the goal was the creation of private profit with support from international development agencies. By integrating into the global tourism market, the project was not meeting the local population's needs, but instead, was generating profit generation by selling comfort and security to Western tourists (Jeannite & Lapointe, 2016; Sarrasin & Renaud, 2014).

Paradoxically, even as an industry based on selling place, tourism, via the same stakeholders, is part of the deterritorializing process at work in the Empire. This is exemplified by AirBnB, Lyft and Uber overruling local bylaws and negotiating directly and simultaneously with states, cities and province to implement their business model.

This is a privatization of development, in the continuity of neo-liberalism where global deterritorialized corporation's profits being the main impetus of development. They become forces of integration as they influence and assist policy makers and recapture powers as intermediaries (Dredge & Gyomóthy, 2015) while weaving the global market space into private (home) and daily life. With its discourse of living the local life, AirBnB and its hosts integrate and create a more uniform world shape through biopower to correspond to tourist representation, therefore creating a more and more uniform tourism performance.

This was also at the core of the tourism bubble (Judd & Fainstein, 1999) concept, that explains the creation of a uniform, secure and controlled urban space fit for tourism, but especially for investment. In this context, tourism is one of the drivers of cultural integration of the particular in the global Empire through its commodification and its uniformization. All space and all culture can theoretically be touristified, but for a *continuous* consumption of tourism as a cultural apparatus, the industry integrated into the global also needs to be somewhat diversified in its performance and experience.

#### 4.2 Tourism in the *Diversification* Phase

The *diversification* phase is where tourism is a core phenomenological trace of the Empire. Although this situation has been neglected in the literature, the whole experience economy (Pine & Gilmore, 1999) paired with the enhanced international mobility of capital, investment and certain class, mostly from what was formerly called the First World, is working through the diversification within integration. In this process, tourism acknowledges cultural differences, but recognizes them through a market-based demands perspective.

The experiential economic turn (Pine & Gilmore, 1999) posits a transformation of the exchange within the cultural economy. Indeed, it transforms the product from a material set of values into an internalized locus of feelings set in the persons or groups living the experience, and obviously, purchasing it. In tourism, culture and cultural differences are no longer socially and politically negotiated subjectivities about "being in the world," they are experiences that can be staged and sold. Replacing exchange with competition transforms

actual tourism because it is anthropologically an act of exchange, a contact between two humans, whether the contact implies monetary exchange or not. The discourse of competition percolates throughout the world of tourism.

Today destinations are in competition with each other, not just capitalist companies, but also the tourism territories, that is, the local, regional and national administrations. This is not inconsequential because this discourse supports a quantitative and undifferentiated vision of the tourist act where, in the end, it is the number of entries, of nights that becomes the supreme indicator, the criterion of success. Growth, as Brown (2015) points out, becomes the *raison d'être* of the economy and the action of the state. Tourism development policies are a direct part of this discourse.

The diversification of tourism not only transforms the very experience of culture through commodification, it transforms the motivation of culture and heritage. As Viken and Müller (2017) state, in the creation of this cultural market tourism, minority cultures not only facing essentializing, they start to internalize commodification through essentialization as a way to save their culture in the global market economy.

Therefore, tourism's recognition process for minority and subaltern cultures is a double-edged sword, offering on the one hand, a moment to express and show others their differences, their way of being in the world, and the very narratives that create meaning for them, but on the other hand, putting them in competition with all the other cultures in the whole global experience market circus.

This situation creates market recognition, a recognition framed by liberal competition where the recognition process that some authors claim tourism can create is done within a narrow window of essentializing and selling culture as an experience. This leads us to the management phase, that is, the ways in which tourism is obsessed with competitiveness and professionalization.

#### 4.3 The *Management* Moment

The *management* moment is when Empire reaffirms its control on the multitude after the emptying of the political subjectivities in the differentiation moment. Tourism in Empire is a tool of

cultural differentiation, but this cultural differentiation is managed for the consumer.

The structuring force of neoliberalism produces an emphasis on culture (a non-competitive market niche), yet also provides the hegemonic model of what counts as culture; that which is remembered and recalled by consumers as appropriate and legitimate to a region, is shaped by both global factors and local history or tradition. Cultural products then need to be recognisable to the target consumer: the foreign visitor. The result is a greater investment in managing cultural products and practices in order to preserve their economic potential and serve the expectations of consumers (Scher, 2011: 8-9).

Management closes the circle by constructing a highly integrated product. This holds particularly true for all-inclusive resorts, where uniqueness as a competitive advantage is produced by cultural commodification. This cultural commodification generates global integration via the figure of the international tourist/consumer.

In a tourism market where, as far as many North American consumers are concerned, there is little to differentiate one island from the next, or one all-inclusive resort from the next, transcending “substitutability” becomes a primary strategy in gaining market share. Cultural differentiation is seen as the answer to “substitutability” as it offers apparent uniqueness. Commodifying cultural forms, such as Carnival, is not only imperative, but it also leads to specific cultural interventions, such as institutional oversights and legal protection to secure market viability (Scher, 2011: 9).

Scher’s (2011) work is particularly instructive in showing how tourism, through its development and management, goes back and forth from integration to differentiation and back to integration. This process is done by transforming non-market amenities, like culture, into market amenities by subjecting them to marketization and commodification to sustain the motion of capital (Higgin- Desbiolles, 2006), which is at the core of the capitalist system (Harvey, 2017). This leads to an assertion of competition as the structuring force of development for resource-poor countries and peripheral areas.

Given the competitive pressures in a neoliberal environment, scarce government resources are allocated to cash-generating export sectors, such as

tourism, which capitalize on their major resources of cheap labour and land. In many developing countries and resource-poor small island states, adherence to the neoliberal principles of liberalisation and deregulation has automatically increased dependency on tourism (Schilcher, 2007).

Within Empire, the assumptions and values involved in this form of tourism development are not politically challenged, bringing tourism into the realm of the post-political. Part of this current trend is that political consensus replaces political challenges or confrontations through the generalized impregnation of the concept of governance in relation to destinations. Thus, tourism territories, under the name “destination,” become resources to manage and to govern like private organizations. This consensual governance aims to achieve overnight stay growth objectives, because hoteliers provide economic means to the Destination Management Organization via the accommodation tax. It is important to note that this tax is collected outside of the territorial political field. Moreover, this characteristic also influences tourism discourses rooted in heritage and history. Indeed, a dominant and economic perspective will lead places and historical facts with disputed interpretations to be flattened by the consensual touristification process.

Finally, the role of tourism in the management moment of Empire is also to partially tame the Multitude by commodifying the desire to travel. In constructing a smooth space of power for capital and its different corollaries, the Empire faces a contradiction. Looking towards Deleuze and Guattari (1980), Hardt and Negri (2000) use the concept of Nomadism to describe the Multitude as a new subjectivity inside Empire but also against Empire.

Nomadism is a movement within the Multitude to find asperities in the smooth space, asperities where they can find a place to express their immanent sovereignty through the expression of their desires and will and create social bonding outside of the market.

If the smooth space of the movement of capital is also creating a smooth space for the movement of the Multitude, the actual possibilities of contacts, of solidarities and of subjectivities should be multiplied and magnified. This is where we argue that tourism within Empire is a strong force of reproduction of Empire processes. Indeed, if according to Deleuze and

Guattari (1980) nomads use their immanent sovereignty and power against the state, tourism becomes “a form of material or psychic nomadism which helps generate whole new or reconditioned assemblages of aspiration for people as they spread across the globe” (Holinshead et al., 2009).

Empire, for its part, uses tourism to harness the Multitude’s desire for movement via a commodification of identity, culture, place and space supported by the internalization of capital exchange as the locus of sociability. It does so in three ways: by *managing the movement of the nomad*; by *transforming movement into a product*; by *transforming subjectivity holders into experience producers in the market*; and finally, by *levelling out the very idea of otherness in the integration of different cultures within an all-encompassing global discourse of culture as a consumption product*.

Tourism, in the management moment of Empire, contributes to harnessing the political subjectivities of the Multitude by transforming non-market amenities into commodified market amenities and by internalizing market exchange as an immanent way of being in the world. All of this is supported by the transcendental principles, including sustainable development, that are promoted by the three bodies of Empire, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.

## 5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Starting with a syncretic approach to international political economy based on the contributions of the neorealist current we offered an understanding of the hegemonic role of some stakeholders in developing a model of global economic organization, through a brief historical review.

The postwar economic order instituted by the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 constituted an international regime composed of rules, norms, principles and procedures. It was established as an institutionalisation of agreements between two major economic powers, the United Kingdom and the United States, based on their joint interests, and through initiatives such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Emerging in the early 1980s as the main proponent of the international neoliberal economic model (IMF, 1987), the IMF established itself as an international regime whose rules and principles are particularly focused on liberalizing trade and

economies and reproducing a monetary and financial order based on capitalism and “market forces.”

The IMF represents the archetype of the institutionalization of neo-liberalism and, although it no longer has the influence it did at its inception, it continues to contribute to the reproduction of a relationship regime based on the hegemonic position of the United States in the aftermath of WWII.

As a potential alternative to the problems of developing economies, characterized, inter alia, by structural deficits in their balance of payments generated by the structural adjustment programs, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Tourism Organization and, more generally, the United Nations, encourage tourism. The combination of structural adjustments and tourism results in a generalization of the market economy and a reproduction of the hegemonic position of the actors in the same market.

During the period of the 1950s and 1960s, which was characterized by generally favorable economic conditions, tourism appeared as a relatively simple means of obtaining foreign exchange for the industrialization of the “poor countries.” Nevertheless, when the uncertain economic climate of the 1970s and 1980s took hold, the fragility of the tourism sector revealed itself and tourism could no longer be perceived as an entirely positive factor for development. At the same time, the question of considering economic growth as the sole objective of development began to be raised.

The deterioration of the international economic situation which has resulted in a deterioration of the terms of trade to the detriment of the countries of the South, coupled with the appearance of political problems (terrorism, conflict in the Middle East, etc.) and environmental issues (pollution, climate change, etc.) has presented an additional hindrance to the development of tourism (Sarrasin 2007, Dieke 2000, Morucci 1991).

This transformation of the international economic situation coupled with critiques of development lead to a reframing, a translation of the development discourse into a sustainable development discourse. This new discourse was carried by the global stakeholders with a strong consensus back then and it still is today, but it has been unable to curb the path of development or the main environmental and social issues. This is why we turned to the theory of Empire to understand how tourism

and sustainable development are embedded in the totality of the world system described by Michael Hardt and Toni Negri (2000).

In Empire we saw a transformation of sovereignty through a return to the transcendental principles and the taming of the Multitude's subjectivities by the internalisation of biopower via the market. This operates in three moments: *the integration into the world system/world market; the differentiation of culture by turning them into products without political subjectivities; and finally, the management of this diversity.*

As we demonstrated, tourism is an inherent part of those three moments. First through the integration of all the world's cultures and countries into the tourism market, but also by the push from the multinational tourism stakeholders to transform nation-states into marketing and managing agencies for an internationally-bound flux of tourists. The differentiation moment is the core moment of tourism within Empire because it is where the market expands to commodify culture as both diverse and competitive inside the tourism market. Finally, the management moment is when biopower becomes embedded in the governance of tourism and becomes a form of social reproduction and control.

If there is different strand of thought and research that advocates tourism and sustainable development as a *locus* of change in the economic and world system, it has only had limited success at the margins, while discourses of globalization and mass tourism keep going strong. This calls for an understanding of the reasons why those discourses endure despite well-founded and longstanding critique.

Our effort was to explore how tourism is contributing to the main process of globalization and the market dominance of neo-liberalism expressed in Empire. Although very few authors address the tourism phenomenon with concepts like biopower, Empire, Multitude, post-politic and political subjectivities, the texts we used draw a rough itinerary that deserves more attention from scholars.

Indeed, tourism is strongly embedded in the political economy and although a great deal of research focusing on destination and local communities portray it as a place-based economic and social activity, it is a world-making global phenomenon (Hollinshead, 2007; 2009) that can no longer be ignored.

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