

Abstract

The political career of federal deputies is marked by intense movements across municipal, state, and federal territorial levels, with high legislative turnover. Given that the state level is a strategic sphere to learn about political circulation, are the state legislators pursuing careers within the legislature or are they trying to move further on? What are their career prospects? This study aims to investigate the career after state legislature of 1.152 state parliamentarians from seven states. The empirical research adopted a career approach, which consists of seeking career patterns through analysis of all offices held in each individual trajectory. The findings suggest that a mandate in the state assembly is a stepping stone to other political positions. Differences in trajectories are found across states, clarifying that state arenas matter to political trajectories since subnational units offer different structures of opportunities. The majority of politicians had ambitions for federal posts, with the exception of São Paulo with local ambitions, Santa Catarina with state ambitions and Goiás with both local and federal ambitions. This study exposes the main routes to state and federal offices and promotes better comprehension of the complex Brazilian career pattern.

Keywords: parliamentary career; state legislators; subnational politics; multi-level system.

A ambição dos deputados estaduais: padrões de carreira no sistema multinível brasileiro.

Resumo

A carreira política de deputados federais é marcada por intensos movimentos entre níveis territoriais municipal, estadual e federal, com alta rotatividade no legislativo. Dado que o âmbito estadual é estratégico para apreender a circulação política, os parlamentares estaduais também estariam buscando outros postos ou eles procuram construir carreira no legislativo? O objetivo do artigo é investigar a carreira após o legislativo estadual no percurso de 1.152 parlamentares de sete estados. Utilizando a metodologia *career approach* que consiste na análise longitudinal de todos os cargos exercidos em cada trajetória individual, os resultados mostram que não tiveram longas carreiras no legislativo estadual, pelo contrário, o utilizaram como trampolim para outras posições políticas. Através das trajetórias analisadas é possível apreender a dinâmica política estadual e diversos padrões emergiram, revelando que o âmbito subnacional importa ao possibilitar diferentes estruturas de oportunidades. A maioria dos deputados apresentaram ambição direcionada aos postos federais, a exceção de São Paulo com ambição local, Santa Catarina com ambição estadual e Goiás com local e federal. Este artigo ajuda compreender as rotas de acesso aos principais cargos estaduais e nacionais, somando no esforço compreensivo do complexo padrão de carreira brasileiro.

Palavras-chave: carreira parlamentar; deputados estaduais; política subnacional; sistema multinível.

Introduction

In his influential research on the careers of political leaders in the United States, Schlesinger (1966) measured the structure of political opportunities at the national and state levels. The national structure of opportunity is measured by the number of offices available in the executive, legislative and judicial branches.² Given federalism, the states were considered the main unit of analysis, especially for federal legislative careers. However, the national opportunities were not equally shared by states; for example, career analysis shows that the governor of New York has higher chances of being president than the governor of South Dakota. In other words, some states' politicians held more federal positions than others because access was uneven.

As regards the state structure of opportunities, the prospects in each state, the party system, institutions, and career patterns differ substantially. Schlesinger (1966, p. 72) analysed the previous political offices of those who

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2 The President and Vice President, the many officials in the executive and the judiciary whom the President appoints. And in the Congress (House of Representatives and Senate).

were governors and senators in order to reveal the typical lines of advancement in political office, which exposed internal political arrangements of each state. The office of the state legislator was a common and frequent experience, as well capture the routes to the state's top political position. Moreover, accessibility of state legislative office "make it likely that many careerists in politics will at some point have held such office" and it is "good place to look for the apprenticeship or sifting of political leaders."

Other scholars realize the potential of studying state parliamentarians career patterns. The state legislature is a valuable place to apprehend career movements and institutional linkage, the post interconnects the federal and local levels, which shed light on political circulation. Moreover, the state legislature exhibit broad range of functions since could be point of entry to a public office career or a stepping stone to other political office, a safety post to assure obtaining another office (Borchert; Stolz, 2011b, p. 208). Therefore, the state legislature is a strategic sphere to apprehend the state political dynamics and career prospects of a given federal unit.

Nonetheless, literature about Brazil has not yet taken advantage of the study of state legislatures. Indeed, legislative studies focus on the two houses of the federal legislature: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (ANASTASIA; INÁCIO, 2011). The study of career movements is important to define the routes to offices, predict who is in a position to hope for advancement, and, more importantly, promote comparison among states, revealing different patterns (SCHLESINGER, 1966; STOLZ, 2022). The state level has particular dynamics that should be better comprehended, it is especially vital to have a comparison among them to properly comprehend a country with continental proportions.

Scholars have established that career of federal legislators are characterized by intense movements across territorial levels and among the executive, legislative and judiciary branches (BORCHERT, 2009; SAMUELS, 2003; SANTOS; PEGURIER, 2011). The country presents an integrated pattern which consists of lack of hierarchy among territorial levels and institutions resulting in frequent shifts of positions. Are the same patterns reproduced in the state Assemblies? Are they pursuing careers within the state legislature or are they trying to move further on? What are their career prospects? If yes, where did they move next? In order to understand the intricate career movement across levels and branches, this study aims to investigate the career after state legislature of 1.152 legislators of seven states (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Bahia, Ceará and Goiás).

This research contributes to filling the gap in the country's selection of studies on political career movements. Research presents a heavy emphasis on the multi-level systems of Europe and North America. It is fundamental to investigate the less-appreciated cases because "... yields valuable information about the evolution of career patterns under various institutional frameworks,

which is of value to comparative studies on political careers" (SEMENOVA, 2023, p. 2).

Understanding a career path is relevant to clarifying who is in line to hope for a given post and exposing the political standards required to achieve such an office. Taking into account the trajectory in each state reveals whether distinct career patterns exist, which elucidates possible differences across states. Brazil had manifold subnational elites in a heterogeneous mosaic with different historical paths, social and cultural settings, economic inequalities, and differences in human development and scientific advancement, but also in health policies and resources. As a result, the federal units have distinct importance in the federation that impacts the political system, especially in the party system and in political careers. Regional political balance in the federal government contributes for governability in coalition presidentialism (ABRANCHES, 1988).

Given that the states do not offer the same opportunity structure, we should understand how an individual's trajectory was affected by it. A subnational perspective is essential for examining how these diversities, multiple structures of opportunities, developments, and institutions impact politics since the place limits or boosts political careers. The subnational arena in Brazil's multi-level system shapes political careers, and comparing federal units is an interpretative model to boost knowledge about entire Brazilian politics. The findings of this research will contribute to the debates over regionalism, federalism, and comparative politics.

The results point out that parliamentarians did not seek to build a career inside the state legislative, on the contrary, a mandate in the state Assembly was a stepping stone to other political position. These findings help to clarify some patterns of legislative careers at the subnational and federal levels are similar, and contribute to understating the "ongoing process" of legislative careers in Brazil (SANTOS, 2012), which is still undergoing since Brazil is a young democracy. In addition, distinct political trajectories emerge across states, indicating the significance of the regional arena in political trajectories. Little is known about Brazilian careers movements and this research will make possible future comparisons of the legislative pattern between two democratic periods, consequently expanding our knowledge about Brazilian career movements.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief account of the literature review and I formulate hypotheses for this study. The third part I describe the research methods, and the following section deals with the data from state Assemblies, and the discussion. The last section concludes that there are three main routes and three ideal types of politicians: the ambitious state deputy, the searcher deputy, and the quitter deputy.

Literature Review

Studies about parliamentary careers were undertaken in many countries, considering the historical devel-

opments of parliamentary elites, social traits of legislators, and political professionalization, among others. To compare representative's profile over long periodization it is relevant since representation is central compound of democracy, second, because institutions and representation process offer a privileged perspective from social and political transformation. Moreover, reveals democratization process since is possible measure the openness to political participation and legislators recruitment to larger social groups (COTTA; BEST, 2007).

The studies on political careers have primarily focused on the recruitment to national parliaments or governments (STOLZ, 2022). In general, they analyse the parliamentary level of education, prior occupational background, prior political experience, and the average tenure length; nonetheless, they do not consider the individual's career in its entirety and disregarding the territorial level of positions held before as well as after legislature; therefore, such approaches have failed to address the career movements across territorial levels and institutional linkage since they highlighted only the path to the national legislature and neglected the place where their career developed, overlooking the moves and exchanges across municipal, state, and federal posts. From this perspective, it is impossible to detect variations across regions (states) concerning the career patterns of their members.

These analyses about parliamentary careers used a static approach (BORCHERT AND STOLZ 2011a) by choosing an institution, often a national legislature, and the researcher analyses the legislators' profile and recruitment in a time span (BEST; EDINGER, 2005; COTTA; BEST, 2007; NORRIS; LOVENDUSKI, 1995). Similarly, Brazilian scholars contribute to the expertise of recruitment and professionalization of federal deputies and senators (CODATO et al., 2022; FLEISCHER, 1973, 1981; GRILL, 2008; GRILL; REIS, 2015; NEIVA; IZUMI, 2014; PERISSINOTTO; BOLOGNESI, 1998; PERISSINOTTO; MIRÍADE, 2009, among others). Notwithstanding, the focus on an institution instead of an individual trajectory is a methodological decision that implies not apprehending interaction across territorial levels, not following the individual's career trajectory in its entirety makes it impossible to analyze all the movements that they may have happened in influencing such career. Given that political careers involve movement, notably at multi-level systems (BORCHERT; STOLZ, 2011a)"properties": {"formattedCitation": "(BORCHERT; STOLZ, 2011a, analyzing an entire trajectory is a choice that ensures apprehending the territorial linkage. Therefore, studies of political careers should incorporate territorial aspects of the system examined (DESCHOUWER, 2001) to better understand all the constraints each career may have received.

Research to date fail to undertake territorial aspects of representation because they ignore the territorial linkage of careers. A remarkable territorial aspect of the Brazilian electoral system is that the states have served

as electoral districts for the majority of offices like state deputies, federal deputies since 1932 up until today; in contrast, a House of Representative member represents one of the 435 single-member districts in the United States, which means that in Brazil, federal legislators suffer pressure to carry on with their respective states agendas (SAMUELS 2003), where their political careers unfolded. In summary, the subnational dynamic impact the whole Brazilian politics, for the sake of comprehending the whole, it is necessary to comprehend the parts.

Other scholars claim the importance of this spatial dimension in a country of continental proportions. Schwartzman (1982) states that all nations have territorial basis and political phenomena are spatially distributed. Thus, politics unfolded differently throughout the territory. Lima Júnior (1983) makes a significant contribution by analyzing the party system in Brazil from 1950-1962 and arguing that partisan behavior is shaped by both spatial (geographic) and temporal (historical) factors. His research reveals a distinct party predominancy at the state level and other party composition at the Chamber of Deputies. In essence, Brazil functioned with coexisting state and national party systems during this period, leading to distinct logics for federal and state legislative representation. This is evidenced by the greater number of parties present in state assemblies compared to the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, it is crucial to comprehend this different logic of legislative representation to improve awareness of subnational levels.

Ambition theory.

Schlesinger (1966, p. 9-10) argues that an individual's current position fosters expectations and aspirations for future office. In contrast, offices with limited chances for progression do not promote office ambitions. "Politics is, after all, a game of advancement, and a man [or woman] succeeds only if he [she] advances as far as his situation will permit." Based on this assumption, Schlesinger states that there are three directions of ambition: discrete, static, and progressive. 1) Discrete: is when a politician desires a position for a period of time and decides to withdraw from public service. 2) Static: occurs when politician wants to build long career in one specific office. 3) Progressive: when the "politician aspires to attain **an office more important** than the one he [she] now seeks or is holding." In this sense, an office foments ambitions. Schlesinger (1966, p. 11) concludes that the office of governor fosters progressive ambition and legislative positions promote static ambition. It is important to highlight that not all governors could expect to run for president since "depend upon the state, for all governorships are not equal." For example, governors of São Paulo often aspire to and run for the presidency of the Republic; on the other hand, governors from the Central-West and North Region have more difficulty projecting themselves nationally. As regards discrete ambition, it could be found in undesirable positions such as "the lowly-paid state legislatures, and where there is little hope of advancement."

Since Schlesinger's study, other researchers have been dedicated to understanding of career movements and discover other career patterns. Stolz (2003) analyses career moves in ten federal systems and finds that in addition to the unidirectional pattern, which is when politicians initiate at the lower level and seek to reach the high level, there are two other patterns. First, the *alternative pattern* when politicians may want to stay at the same territorial level. Second, the *integrated pattern*, where there is no hierarchy between territorial levels and institutions such as legislative and executive, with frequent interchange. This finding is relevant because Schlesinger implies a hierarchy of offices; in fact, it is difficult to define which office is more appealing than others everywhere.

Confirming these outcomes, Borchert (2009) compares the United States, Brazil, and Germany and associates them with those three patterns of career. The United States was considering an unilinear pattern, according to the author, there is a clear office hierarchy, and politicians desire to reach the high positions define as a territorial conception in which ambitious politicians want to govern as many people as possible.³ The path is from the local to the regional, from the regional to the federal levels. Germany has the alternative pattern where there are routes and hierarchies defined. The pathways are separated: from local to state level and from local to federal level, however, the route from state to national is not common (BORCHERT; STOLZ, 2011b). Finally, Brazil has an integrated pattern, which means a lack of delimitation and hierarchy, with great incentives to access available positions, resulting in intense career movements.

Likewise, other studies confirm that Brazilian political career present an intense movement across territorial levels. Santos and Pegurier (2011) reinforce the territorial linkage and highlight that political careers are characterized by movements among the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches as well. Samuels (2003) also describes a high degree of alteration between the executive and legislative branches in his study of the federal Chamber of Deputies. Moreover, federalism structures political ambition for subnational units instead of federal deputies pursue a career in the federal legislature, they are eager to move to the next position at the state and municipal levels. From Samuel's point of view, the Chamber of Deputies is a stepping stone to subnational positions.

Many studies refute Samuel's claim by arguing that the federal Chamber is attractive and essential to Brazilian political careers (BOTERO AND RENNÓ 2007; PEGURIER, 2012; SANTOS AND PEGURIER 2011). Although Santos and Pegurier (2011) contest Samuels, they recognize that federal deputies realize how the Chamber could be a lynchpin to subnational positions. In this sense, it is necessary to deepen and contribute to understanding the complex career movement among levels and branches that are clear-cut in Brazil.

Legislative careers in Brazil

Studies about legislative careers is heavily concentrated on national level. A relevant research is Marengo dos Santos' (1998) analysis of federal deputy recruitment from 1946 to 1998. The author found that the Chamber of Deputies had high turnover rates; in other words, legislators did not pursue a career inside the legislature. This situation stabilized in the legislatures of 1998 and 2002, when legislators winning reelection were 69% and 70%, respectively (SANTOS, 2012).

Only recently scholars have paid attention to subnational legislatures. As regards state Assemblies, there are research for parliamentary behavior (CASTRO; ANASTASIA; NUNES, 2009) executive and legislative relations ((NUNES, 2009; SANTOS, 2001; SILAME, 2016; TOMIO; RICCI, 2012a), party system (BOHN; PAIVA, 2009; CARREIRÃO; PERONDI, 2009; MELO, 2015), and parliamentary backgrounds (BORDIGNON, 2017; BRAGA; NICOLÁS, 2008; CAMPOS; DUARTE, 2011; HEINZ, 2005) parliamentary perception study (FELISBINO; KERBAUY, 2013; ROCHA; COSTA, 2012), state Assembly public image (FUKS, 2010) electoral connections (CERVI, 2009; CORRÊA, 2016; ROCHA, 2021; TOMIO; RICCI, 2009), legislative careers (ANASTASIA; CORREA; NUNES, 2012; SANTOS, 2012; AUTHOR, 2021). Meanwhile, most of these studies tend to take into consideration one case without a comparative perspective, with some exceptions.

Some scholars had the premise that state legislatures followed the Chamber of Deputies' rationale. Brazil's political structure is quite uniform at both the national and subnational levels with a combination of federalism, presidentialism, multipartyism, and open-list proportional representation in elections at the federal, state, and local levels. However, there are important differences, such as the fact that legislative bodies in states are unicameral and the distribution of powers between the national and subnational levels makes state executives not powerful as federal executive. For this reason, it is crucial to consider that the subnational arena has its own singularities and cannot be reduced to a simple reproduction of the federal sphere (CARNEIRO; ALMEIDA, 2008; ROCHA; COSTA, 2012; ROCHA; KERBAUY, 2014; SANTOS, 2001; SOUZA, 2006; TOMIO; RICCI, 2012).

In fact, there are noticeable distinctions among states despite the fact that subnational and federal arenas share the same institutions. Furthermore, the same parliamentary house presents alterations among different constitutional regimes. Tomio and Ricci (2012b) analyses Brazilian federalism over periods, including Federal Constitutions of 1891, 1934, 1937, 1946, 1967 and 1988. As regard distribution of power and competences between states and federal level, since 1934 the Union had more legislative competences than states. However, the Constitution of 1946 did not limit the state parliamentary initiative so extensively, the executive and legislative

³ This definition is still incomplete since many cities have a larger population than entire states. For example, the city of São Paulo (12,2 million) is more populous than the states of Roraima (488.072), Amapá (734.995), and Acre (776.463). In a clear office hierarchy, a city is lower than a state.

competed for the same state competencies which allowed cases of legislative activism. The democracy of 1945-1964 was a unique legislative experience as the states had great legislative autonomy. On the other hand, legislative competencies were restricted in the military regime (1964-1988) and some of these limitations persist in the Constitution of 1988. Due to the singular legislative-executive relations period, this paper investigates the legislators in the period of democracy of 1945-1964 (Tomio & Ricci, 2012).

Considering the integrated pattern of the Chamber of Deputies and the equal institutional framework at both levels, did the state legislature share the same lack of hierarchy among territorial levels and institutions, resulting in frequent shifts of positions as the federal legislature? According to Marengo dos Santos' (1998), the Chamber of Deputies had high levels of turnover since legislators did not pursue a career inside the legislature. As Samuels (2003) states, federal deputy does not have incentive to present a static ambition and try re-election, on the contrary, they have progressive ambition outside state legislative. The hypothesis 1 investigates if the literature findings on federal deputies' careers also apply to state deputies.

Hypothesis 1: same institutional framework promotes similar patterns of legislative career at state level.

Given that federal and state levels share same political institutions and incentives, state legislators should follow the same pattern, confirming a integrated pattern in Brazilian legislative. To verify if state legislators follow the same pattern, I will analyse the reasons for leaving the state assembly, if the state legislature is the final point in their careers or not.

Methodology

Brazil has a sharp contrast within its regions in terms of economic, social, scientific, and human development. As a result of the inequalities, the states' assemblies have different resources that impact organizing and disclosing data in an uneven manner. Some of them do not have historical data, such as the completed list of names of former deputies, which requires that researchers make a field trip to the Assembly in order to discover who the former deputies were. Regional inequalities matter in the selection of cases since some assemblies can offer online data and others cannot. Unfortunately, the choice of cases to be treated was limited by available online data because the research was conducted during the coronavirus pandemic.⁴ For this reason, no state in the North Region was included.

Among the states selected, the assemblies offered an unequal amount of information. They do not have any standardization and do not follow the good level of pub-

⁴ The assemblies of the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pará, Pernambuco, Maranhão, and Sergipe offer data that requires presential research. The state of Amazonas did not answer me about the data.

⁵ I contacted societies of history and genealogy; Academies of Letters; state dictionaries; virtual newspaper libraries with local newspapers and magazines; state research foundations; memory centres; local museums; state and municipal public archives; research groups of universities.

⁶ José Luís Gobbi, deputy Humberto Gobbi's son, from Rio Grande do Sul. Mauro Silper, deputy Fabio Antônio da Silva Pereira' son, from Minas Gerais. Lenora Barbo, deputy Manoel Demóstenes Barbo de Siqueira' daughter, from Goiás. And councilor João Pedro Azevedo, from Rio Grande do Sul.

licization of the federal Chamber of Deputies; instead, each legislative body has its own manner of organization and publicity. In summary, state assemblies did not offer the total information that research needs; in some cases, only the number of mandates in the state assembly and party affiliation at the time were available.

Because the state legislature did not provide all the requested data, it was necessary to search other institutions. In each state, I found different resources,⁵ and even federal institutions like the Regional Electoral Court (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral -TRE) provide a distinct amount of municipal electoral data. In some states, municipal data were missing. I contacted every municipal executive and legislative body to obtain information about politicians' careers. I also interviewed the sons and daughters of politicians by phone and email.⁶ I consulted the dictionary from the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, and newspapers from Hemeroteca Digital.

Despite that the selection of sample were the members of the legislature from 1946 to 1963, a career perspective is used (BORCHERT and STOLZ, 2011). As an outcome, the individual political trajectories of politicians are considered from the first to the last elective or non-elective positions at local, regional, and federal levels. The intention is to trace their careers from the beginning to the end, taking into consideration their positions in political parties, governments, and legislatures. A different time span for each trajectory was considered since some legislators began their careers in the First Republic, and others held the final position in the current democracy after 1988.

I searched for every state legislator's biography and political trajectory. I sought to ascertain the date of birth and death, place of birth, affiliation, name and family of the wife or husband, any relatives in politics, educational background, professions they have exercised, as well as all partisan affiliations. I tracked down positions held, such as elective offices and those appointed in the executive (municipal, state, and federal) and public administration, as well as previous and concomitant careers. The number of mandates in the Assembly, the partisan positions, and legislative work (committee work, presidency of the legislative house, etc.) The entire subsequent career was also investigated, such as other elective mandates and appointed positions, as well as if they opted for other careers, failed to be reelected, and lost their mandate and political rights.

Given that I tracked down all offices over the duration of each given career, obtaining information at the municipal level was arduous. Brazil has 5.570 municipalities with enormous heterogeneity and economic inequalities; rich big cities like São Paulo offer great data

publicization, and many small cities barely maintain an official website. As a result, several municipal executives and legislatives did not respond to my questions, and others informed me that they did not know who the former councilman from the city was, especially from the period between the First Republic (1889–1930) and the 1930s. Although municipal information was sought, in many cases it was unavailable. It is important to clarify that my sample might be biased based on municipal data, and it is possible that politicians had long careers at the local level, and I could not obtain the data.

The total sample, my universe of cases, is 1.152 state legislators. State constitutions established a fixed number of representatives in each legislature,⁷ taking into account the number of seats available and reelections, given that each politician was counted once; from Bahia there were a total of 173 legislators, in Ceará, 124; in Goiás, 104 representatives; in Minas Gerais, 208; in the Rio Grande do Sul, 174; in Santa Catarina 126; and São Paulo, 243 deputies.

Table 1 – Selection of state deputies

States	BA	CE	GO	MG	RS	SC	SP	Total
Seats available in 1947 to 1963	240	190	128	292	220	156	316	1542
Deputies elected in 1947 to 1963 ⁸	173	124	104	208	173	126	243	1152

Source: State assemblies


In addition to newcomers from each legislative term, I included 10% of the most voted candidates that were not elected and acted as a substitute for the legislator, a total of 147 politicians. Brazilian legislators are allowed to withdraw for a period without losing their mandate, then a substitute from each party assumes temporarily. Another important point is the selection of deputies, I maintained in the sample every politician that assumed the mandate, notwithstanding if he or she lost their political rights or resigned posteriorly.

Brazilian State Assemblies

To explore careers after the state assembly, it is first necessary to verify if they pursued a career inside the state legislature. The static ambition inside the state legislature was not found in parliamentarians' careers. The Boxplot 1 shows the number of mandates per politician in the state legislative assemblies; the data is regarding how

many terms they held over their career, not necessarily between 1947 and 1963. An analysis of Boxplot indicates that most state deputies did not hold office for extended periods since 50% remained for no more than two mandates and 75% for no more than three mandates.

Boxplot 1 - Number of parliamentarians' mandates in the state assemblies



Source: State Assemblies

Given that the deputies generally did not establish long-term careers within the state legislatures, moving on now to consider the deputy's reasons for leaving the legislature. After an analysis of each case, I classified the common motives, as shown in Table 2. The most frequent was interest in another political office, or they ran to other offices, which did not imply success in this undertaking; or they chose not to try for re-election and maintain a partisan activity. The most willing legislators eager to try new positions were those from Rio Grande do Sul, with 60% of them, followed by 50% of deputies from Goiás and 40% from Ceará.

A professional shift is another significant option to leave the state legislature. Choosing a different path meant that the person withdrew from politics as they went back to their initial profession or pursued other careers. A frequent route was the switch to a stable and profitable position in state, federal, or local administration. One of the most desired positions was that of minister of the State Court of Accounts, appointed by the state governor; even more appealing was the post of minister of the Federal Court of Accounts nominated by the president of the Republic. Minas Gerais, Santa Catarina, and Bahia were the assemblies with the highest rates of career change.

Table 2 – Motivation for leaving state assembly.

⁷ Some constitutions allowed increase the number of deputies as population grows. The Constitution of Goiás established 32 deputies for entire period; in the Rio Grande do Sul 55 legislators; in the Minas Gerais 72, which increased to 74 in 1959; in Santa Catarina started with 37 and ended with 41; in Ceará 45, growing to 55 in 1959; in Bahia 60 seats; and in São Paulo 75 and augmented to 91.

⁸ Deputies were count only once, including the 10% of the top-performing candidates.

Deputy's reasons	MG	SP	BA	RS	CE	SC	GO
Retirement	4%	3%	8%	1%	9%	5%	4%
Loss of political rights	2%	11%	2%	7%	6%	2%	3%
Unknown	12%	6%	5%	7%	6%	4%	5%
Death	4%	7%	6%	3%	4%	1%	4%
Not re-election	13%	26%	22%	9%	16%	27%	15%
Other political position	38%	38%	36%	60%	40%	39%	50%
Career change	27%	9%	21%	13%	19%	22%	19%

Source: author elaboration from Fapesp Postdoctoral project

From the exposed data, it is possible to conclude that some literature findings on federal deputies' careers apply to state deputies. State deputies did not seek careers inside the legislature as well. Likewise, Samuels (2003) outcomes for federal deputies are confirmed for state deputies, as they did not have static ambition and tried re-election. Since the most frequent motive to leave the assembly was trying to achieve other political positions and not retirement, which was expected in the case of static ambition, hypothesis 1 is accepted. Both federal and state legislators presented the same short and discontinuous legislative careers, which exposes a Brazilian legislative standard in both democratic periods.

The Table 2 shows a sizable number of candidates in some states who were unsuccessful in winning reelection. Since they were not elected to the state legislature again, they choose to either leave politics or took another political path such as running for another office or having partisan activity. The number of retirements provides information on representatives who choose not to run for office again and who were not involved in any public political action. The number of deaths includes people who died while carrying out their mandates.

Politicians who lose their political rights are a further essential piece of information from Table 2. This information details when a politician lost their mandate as state deputy and for this reason had to left legislature, which happened in 1948 when the Federal Justice determined that being a member of the Communist Party was illegal, and from the military regime beginning in 1964. Even in the absence of political rights, some politicians persisted in their political activism and involvement in parties; whereas others left politics or were killed by the military regime.

Having shown the motives of leave state legislature, turning now to consider the deputies' next step. Which routes are the most frequent? What are the most prevalent exercised positions? The most typical position that follow being a state deputy was federal deputy, as shown in Table 3. Therefore, state deputy exhibited a progressive ambition.

Table 3- Frequency of positions after the state assembly

	MG	SP	BA	RS	CE	SC	GO
Mayor	13 (10%)	22 (13,5%)	14 (11,2%)	24 (14%)	11 (10%)	12 (10%)	16 (14%)
Vice Mayor	1 (1%)	7 (4%)	0	5 (3%)	2 (1%)	1 (1%)	3 (3%)
Municipal minister	2 (2%)	12 (7%)	4 (3,2%)	2 (1%)	1 (1%)	2 (2%)	4 (3%)
Councilman	4 (3%)	15 (9%)	6 (4,8%)	8 (4%)	0	4 (3%)	4 (3%)
Local leader	1 (1%)	0	2 (1,6%)	2 (1%)	5 (5%)	0	2 (2%)
Governor	3 (2%)	3 (2%)	4 (3,2%)	3 (2%)	2 (2%)	1 (1%)	2 (2%)
Vice governor	2 (2%)	2 (1%)	4 (3,2%)	1 (0,5%)	3 (3%)	2 (2%)	2 (2%)
State minister	21 (17%)	22 (13%)	26 (20,8%)	34 (19%)	20 (19%)	33 (27%)	24 (21%)

Minister Court of Accounts ⁹	15 (12%)	8 (5%)	11 (8,8%)	8 (4%)	13 (12%)	18 (16%)	10 (9%)
Federal deputy	49 (40%)	41 (25%)	34 (23%)	41 (23%)	28 (25%)	15 (13%)	25 (22%)
Senator	5 (4%)	7 (4%)	11 (8,8%)	9 (5%)	8 (8%)	4 (3%)	4 (3%)
President of the Republic/Prime Minister	1 (1%)	1 (1%)	0	2 (1,1%)	0	0	0
Vice President	0	0	0	1 (0,5%)	0	0	0
Federal Minister	4 (3%)	4 (2,5%)	4 (3%)	8 (4,5%)	2 (2%)	0	0
Partisan activity	2 (2%)	20 (12%)	5 (4%)	28 (16%)	9 (9%)	23 (20%)	19 (16%)
Total of state deputies	123	164	125	176	104	115	115

Source: author elaboration from Fapesp Postdoctoral project

The office of a federal deputy was seen as a natural progression, except for deputies from Santa Catarina. There was a clear route from the state legislature to the National Congress (Chamber of Deputies and Senate); this path was made by 44% of those from Minas Gerais, 36% from Bahia, 35% from Ceará, 29% from São Paulo, 28% from Rio Grande do Sul, and 25% from Goiás. Another important office exercised was that of a minister at the state level, the first-most regular in Santa Catarina (27%) and the second-most in Minas Gerais (17%), Bahia (20%), Rio Grande do Sul and Ceará (19%), and Goiás (21%). The state assembly was a remarkable linchpin to the safe position of minister of the Court of Accounts. A frequent route in Bahia, Minas Gerais, Ceará, and Santa Catarina which confirms the high number of career changes in those states. Other relevant position was the mayor that maintained at more than 10% in all states.

Table 4 – Deputy's territorial level ambition.

All Assemblies	MG	SP	BA	RS	CE	SC	GO
Federal	Federal	Local	Federal	Federal	Federal	State	Federal and local
State	State	Federal	State	Local	State	Partisan activity	Federal and local
Local	Local	State	Local	State	Local	Federal	State
Partisan activity	Court of Accounts	Partisan activity	Court of Accounts	Partisan activity	Court of Accounts	Local	Partisan activity
Court of Accounts	Judiciary	Court of Accounts	Judiciary	Court of Accounts	Partisan activity	Court of Accounts	Court of Accounts
Judiciary	Partisan activity	Judiciary	Partisan activity	Judiciary	Judiciary	Judiciary	Judiciary

Source: author elaboration from Fapesp Postdoctoral project

The majority of parliamentary presented a progressive ambition to federal level, as shown in Table 4. Then a ambition at state and local government, and partisan activities. In fourth place, the safe position in the Court of Accounts, followed by offices in Judiciary. Three states diverge from these patterns: in São Paulo they chose the local level first; those from Santa Catarina they preferred state level and partisan activities to federal posts; and in Goiás they had appealing to both federal and local levels.

Conclusion

After the 1.152 representatives left the state assembly three typical routes are identified. Their preferred pathway consisted in seeking other political positions. In the second place both changing careers and not obtaining re-election are the other two usual paths. Three main types of politicians result from this: the ambitious state deputy; the searcher deputy, who is always open to opportunities outside of politics; and the quitter deputy.

The first ideal type is the ambitious state deputy, which consist of was 491 of parliamentarians in total. The state legislatures of Rio Grande do Sul and Goiás are above average because each present more than 50% of this type of politician, followed by Ceará (40%), Santa Catarina (39%), Minas Gerais (38%), São Paulo (38%), and Bahia (36%). Most of the legislators in each parliament have taken chances in other political positions; nevertheless, they 9 Could be a position at state and municipal level.

have chosen vastly different paths, most of them (27%) opted to run for a federal office.

Indeed, one characteristic that distinguishes state deputies is their desire for federal positions, especially the position at the federal executive. Only deputies from São Paulo and Minas Gerais were elected President of Republic, and from Rio Grande do Sul a deputy João Goulart became Vice-President, later assumed the presidency. Moreover, Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais both had a Prime Minister as well. The fact that Santa Catarina and Goiás had no deputy as Minister is relevant, while Rio Grande do Sul had 8 deputies which became ministers; São Paulo, Bahia and Minas Gerais each had 4, and Ceará 2. Why did South and Southeast politicians hold more offices, like the presidency and ministers of State, than North and Central West politicians? Because the place where a politician builds his or her career matters in an unequal subnational context since in South and Southeast regions one has more opportunities and possibilities than another one in North and Central West regions.

The state of Minas Gerais exemplify a rich state opportunity structure as 65% of the state deputies saw the state legislature as a stepping stone to a political office (38%) or to career changes (27%). The state has the biggest number of municipalities in Brazil (853 cities), where there are jobs in the executive, legislative, and political parties. Moreover, the state administration structure was huge, and they also had access to federal appointed positions. After state parliament, they sought to federal positions as 28% (federal deputies, senators, ministers, and Tancredo Neves was Prime minister and president elected); and 12% remained at regional positions, especially as state ministers; finally, 10% endured at local positions. The post of minister in the state court of accounts was relevant, following by shift to judiciary career and partisan activities.

It important to highlight that a municipal and state ambition appeared in all states, reveling the posts of state ministers and mayor as frequent paths. In Rio Grande do Sul a mandate in the state assembly was the lynchpin of a successful political career in the federal level. Nevertheless, the high number of local positions, especially the presence of mayors reveals that no hierarchy between territorial levels and institutions such legislative and executive, with frequent interchange, i.e., the integrated pattern. On the other hand, in São Paulo deputies sought local positions as the first option. Another peculiar path occurred in Santa Catarina, where parliamentarians search more for state positions and partisan activities than for federal ones. The choice could be a consequence of a state assembly that does not offer options for advancement, fewer federal positions were available to politicians from this place. As they held the least federal positions, they showed the most localised ambition. Likewise, the state structure of opportunity in Goiás restricted deputy's ambition. Although they were very interested in politics and demonstrated a desire for the federal level, as they held federal deputy and senatorial offices, they did not

hold any federal posts in the executive. For this reason, federal legislative, local, and state positions were frequent in deputies' careers because Goiás did not share many federal positions.

The ideal type of searcher deputy was the second more frequent. The considerable number of politicians who change career (209 of them) is explained because being a state deputy during that periodization was not a profitable or safe job. According to parliamentarians' memoirs, at that period they did not have the resources available nowadays, like payment of assessors, transportation, and house allowance. From the data gathered, many legislators exercised one or more professions concomitant with political office. Provided that resources from the legislature were not capable to supply basic needs, it is likely that political offices were not understood as main activity. Extensive part of parliamentarians did not financially rely on politics. Consequently, a great deal of them took advantage of this opportunity to boost themselves into a more desirable position.

Finally, the ideal type of quitter deputy is challenging to fully grasp. This kind of politician ran for re-election but was unsuccessful and left politics. Their desire was not strong enough; in contrast, some politicians lose their political rights and yet returned in democratic times, and others persist in running until achieved political office. The case is relevant in Santa Catarina (27%), São Paulo (26%) and Bahia (22%). In São Paulo, the reason could be coercion by the military dictatorship. The historical behaviour of confronting the federal government cost lives, mandates, and the closure of state legislative body. It is very difficult to capture the causation between military coercion and quitting politics, but even an ambitious politician took some time out of politics during the hardest time of the military regime. However, in Rio Grande do Sul they were also strongly punished, and the state deputies continued in politics.

According to the above expose, for a majority of politicians (61% of them) the state legislature was a stepping stone to other political positions or another career. A mandate in the assembly is important to fulfil politicians' ambitions, even if this means ambition for a stable job in public administration. The office provided an opportunity for 43% of deputies who continued in politics. This potentiality is clear from the relevance of names in the sample, there are president Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, ministers, governors, President of Senate Auro Moura Andrade, President of the Chamber of Deputies Ernesto Pereira Lopes, relevant deputies in the democratisation process such as Tancredo Neves, Ulisses Guimarães, Paulo Brossard, many potential leaders that had career interrupted by the military regime such as Leonel Brizolla; those leaders promoted by the regime such as Antônio Carlos Magalhães, and many professional politicians like Bonifácio de Andrada. Politicians that participated in political disputes in the democracy of 1945, the coup of 1964, opposed or supported the military regime. As Schlesinger states, the position of state deputy is a

good place to apprentice and where careerists may arise, indeed, crucial leaders of Brazilian political history are present in the list of 1.152 state deputies.

Brazilian political careers also differ from Schlesinger's assumption, as other scholars have been appointed in other contexts (Seminova, 2021; Stolz, 2003; Samuels, 2003). An important finding that could help elucidate the complex Brazilian career movement is that federal and state legislative bodies shared a career pattern in the first democracy. Legislators did not pursue a career inside the legislature. The deputies' trajectories also corroborate with an integrated career pattern that the state level presented an interaction of territorial levels and institutions (legislative, executive, and judiciary).

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